The effect of disability on labour market outcomes by Ongere, Ruth Boyani
 
 
THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY ON LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
 
A RESEARCH DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE MASTER OF COMMERCE IN ECONMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
 
RUTH BOYANI ONGERE 
ONGRUT001 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 2019 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ii 
DECLARATION 
The work presented in this paper is my original work and has not been presented before in the 
university or any other institution outside the university. The information collected from different 
sources is true and relevant and has not been manipulated in any way. 
Signature_______________________              Date________________________ 
RUTH BOYANI ONGERE 
ONGRUT001 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to acknowledge and thank my supervisor, Dr. Cecil Mlatsheni for his invaluable and 
insightful guidance through the entire process of writing my dissertation. The completion of this 
study would not have been possible without you. My heartfelt gratitude to my parents for the 
sacrifices they made to make my journey at the University of Cape Town possible. I sincerely 
thank you from the deepest parts of my heart.  
 
I would also like to thank my siblings and friends for their continuous support and encouragement 
which gave me that extra push and motivation to complete my studies. You are appreciated! To 
my classmates and lecturers, thank you for your knowledgeable interactions and for making things 
seem easy even when they were not. Most importantly, I thank God for holding it together and for 
keeping an eye on me during my time at the University of Cape Town. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................. iii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... vi 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. vii 
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................................. 1 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.0 Background to the study ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Motivation for the study ........................................................................................................ 5 
1.2 Statement of the problem ...................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Objectives of the study .......................................................................................................... 8 
1.4 Significance of the Study ...................................................................................................... 8 
CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................................ 9 
LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 9 
2.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1 Taste-based discrimination ........................................................................................... 11 
2.1.2 Statistical discrimination .............................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Empirical Evidence ............................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.1 Barriers to the employment of PWDs ........................................................................... 15 
2.2.2 Relationship between disability and other labour market determinants ....................... 20 
2.2.3 International studies ...................................................................................................... 26 
2.2.4 South African studies .................................................................................................... 29 
2.3 Summary of Literature Review ........................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................................... 32 
METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 32 
3.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 32 
3.1 Data ..................................................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 Model specification ............................................................................................................. 33 
3.2.1 Pooled ordinary least squares model (POLS) ............................................................... 33 
3.2.2 Random effects and fixed effects model ...................................................................... 35 
3.2.3 Specification tests ......................................................................................................... 36 
3.3 Data coding and manipulation ............................................................................................. 36 
v 
 
3.3.1 Dependent variables ..................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.2 Independent variables ................................................................................................... 37 
CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................................... 39 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................................... 39 
4.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 39 
4.1 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................ 39 
4.1.1 Summary statistics of regression variables ................................................................... 39 
4.1.2 Disability and age, gender, race, education, depression, marital status ....................... 40 
4.1.3 Disability and occupation/sector .................................................................................. 43 
4.2 Results ................................................................................................................................. 45 
4.2.1 Specification test results ................................................................................................... 45 
4.2.2 Fixed effects ................................................................................................................. 46 
4.4 Discussion of results ............................................................................................................ 48 
CHAPTER FIVE .......................................................................................................................... 52 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 52 
5.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 52 
5.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 52 
5.2 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 53 
5.3 Recommendations for future research ................................................................................. 55 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 57 
Appendix 1: Pooled OLS regression results ................................................................................. 65 
Appendix 2: Random effects model results .................................................................................. 66 
Appendix 3: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects on disability ..... 67 
Appendix 4: Hausman test for fixed vs random effects model on disability ................................ 68 
Appendix 5: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test for random effects on disability type .............. 70 
Appendix 6: Hausman test for fixed vs random effects model on disability type ........................ 71 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Summary of regression variables .................................................................................... 40 
Table 2: Level of occupation for PWD’s and persons without disabilities .................................. 44 
Table 3: Sectors occupied by PWD’s and persons without disabilities ........................................ 45 
Table 4: Fixed effects model regression results ............................................................................ 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study estimated the effect of disability, disability type and disability grants on labour force 
participation, employment and wages using NIDS data from Wave 1 to Wave 4. Data was analysed 
as a panel to account for the effects over time. A pooled OLS, a random effects and a fixed effects 
model were applied on the panel dataset to explain the effects of disability, disability type and 
disability grants on labour market outcomes. To determine which of these models was the most 
appropriate, specification tests were performed. The Hausman test revealed that the fixed effects 
model was the most appropriate model in explaining the panel dataset. Results from the fixed 
effects model indicated that disability had no effect on labour force participation and employment 
but had a negative effect on wages, as wages were likely to decrease by 8% after an individual 
became disabled. Disability grants had disincentive effects on labour supply as grant recipients 
were 12% less likely to participate in the labour market and 8% less likely to be employed.  
Disability type was found to have no effect on labour force participation, employment and wages 
except for individuals with sight/hearing and speech disabilities as their wages were likely to 
decrease by 14% after individuals developed problems with sight, hearing or speech. Results from 
the pooled OLS and random effects model however found significant effects of disability, 
disability type and disability grants on all labour market outcomes. Despite estimation biases that 
do not account for self-selection or the lack of correlation between unobservable characteristics 
and independent variables, random effects models allow for the generalization of results beyond 
the sample and may be of interest to policy makers. This however requires further investigation 
using multilevel models that correct for selection bias. This study concluded that disability had 
negative effects on labour market outcomes particularly on wages, demonstrating that PWDs 
remain economically disadvantaged. The implementation of policies that prioritize equity for 
PWDs in workplaces is therefore recommended.  
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background to the study 
Studies have attempted to explain the inequalities in labour market outcomes which take the form 
of wage or non-wage discrimination based on characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, 
and religion, just to mention a few. Wage discrimination occurs when there are disparities in 
income based on non-productivity characteristics, while non-wage discrimination occurs when 
there are disparities in non-monetary compensation rewarded to employees beyond the traditional 
wage and salary payments (Budd, 2004). Despite the growing population of people with 
disabilities (PWDs), there exists limited research on discrimination based on disability, yet PWDs 
are important to an economy because they are a source of labour and convey a sense of social 
responsibility for the organisations that employ them. PWDs provide an untapped pool of talent 
that can provide a solution to the shortage of skills, especially in the case of South Africa which 
faces a looming skills gap (Silver & Koopman, 2002).  
 
With an estimated population of 55 million, 7.7% of the South African population has reported 
some form of disability (Statistics South Africa, 2016). Such large numbers require an 
understanding of the relationship between disability and labour market outcomes because of the 
huge disparity that exists between PWDs and their non-disabled counterparts. Given that only 
1.2% of top management jobs are currently occupied by PWDs, with less than 1% participating in 
senior management, professionally qualified, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled job levels, it is 
important for policy makers to offset the negative effects that come with having a disability 
(Commission for Employment Equity, 2017). The adverse effects associated with the hiring of 
PWDs stem from the negative perception of society towards disability because it defies cultural 
norms and is sometimes viewed as a curse (Baldwin & Johnson, 2000; Eskay et al., 2012). 
Overtime, several organisations have emerged fighting for the rights of PWDs because of the high 
rates of poverty that are evident within this group (United Nations, 2011). The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) is one such organisation that 
ensures PWDs participate in the labour market especially after statistics indicated that in 2000, at 
the peak of economic expansion, the percentage of working age PWDs that lived below the poverty 
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line increased to 28.5% from 26.6% in 1989, while that of non-disabled persons declined from 9% 
to 8.1% within the same period (United Nations, 2011; Stapleton, Burkhauser & Houtenville, 
2004).  
 
Even though there has been a shift towards the acceptance of PWDs, such emphasis has been 
theoretical more than it has been practical. PWDs remain economically disadvantaged as they are 
more likely to work in lower level occupations or have lower employment rates and earnings, 
because of their lower levels of education (Elwan, 1999; Hum & Simpson, 2015; Brown & Emery, 
2008). Such poor labour market outcomes have been attributed to high dropout rates from 
traditional education systems but even the emergence of special education schools has not tilted 
the outcome in their favour (Aron & Loprest, 2012). As is the case in several developed countries, 
the case in South Africa is not any different. The disabled are marginalised in accessing education 
from early childhood development to tertiary education, which explains the existence of low 
qualifications amongst this group (Statistics South Africa, 2011).  
 
Given that low labour market participation rates have direct consequences on employment 
earnings, it is no surprise that PWDs find themselves at the lower end of the economic ladder. This 
further entrenches the existence of a relationship between poverty and disability because of the 
substantial differences in income between PWDs and their non-disabled counterparts (Elwan, 
1999). Hum & Simpson (2015), Brown & Emery (2008) and Baldwin & Johnson (2000) provide 
evidence confirming the existence of a relationship between poverty and disability when they find 
that PWDs earn less than persons without disabilities. Cain (1986), Hahn (1988) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2003) provide further 
evidence suggesting high unemployment rates and low earnings amongst PWDs, which increases 
their risk of poverty and social exclusion. To minimize these effects, several countries have 
adopted policies that seek to reduce the disparities in labour market outcomes for PWDs.  
 
In the UK and USA, the Disability Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disability Act have 
both been enacted to minimize and eliminate discrimination against PWDs (Jones, 2008). Such 
Acts of legislation intensify the fight against workplace discrimination and promote the attainment 
of equality in labour market outcomes, but their usefulness in reducing unemployment rates has 
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been questioned by several scholars. In both cases, these Acts have been found to have no direct 
impact on the employment of PWDs because of high financial costs associated with their 
recruitment, and a lack of awareness amongst both employers and the disabled (Bell & 
Heitmueller, 2009; Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001). The South African Government has made similar 
attempts through the introduction of the Integrated National Disability Strategy of South Africa, 
the Employment Equity Act, the Code of Good Practice on the Employment of PWDs in the 
Workplace and the White Paper on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002; Republic of South Africa, 1997; Republic of South Africa, 1998; Republic of South 
Africa, 2015). The effects have however been unsatisfactory with minimal progress as labour 
market participation rates for PWDs remains low (Commission for Employment Equity, 2017).  
 
In addition to the various Acts of legislation, other disability benefit policies have been 
implemented to compensate for the loss in cash flow experienced by PWDs. In OECD countries 
particularly, the number of recipients of disability benefits has grown considerably over time 
because recipients become dependent on the grant and rarely go back to the labour market once 
the benefit has been awarded (OECD, 2003). South Africa has a similar social benefits system that 
is administered by the South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) where there are currently 
1.06 million people receiving the disability grant (SASSA, 2018). This number has however 
declined over the past decade, compared to the period between 2001 and 2007 where significant 
increases in the number of recipients were observed (Kelly, 2013). The decline in the number of 
recipients has been attributed to the introduction of a harmonized assessment tool that attempts to 
regulate the application process by better defining disability and increasing the oversight function 
of medical officers and SASSA agents (Kelly, 2013). Unlike other developed countries where the 
disability grant is quite high, disability grant holders in South Africa currently receive R1 690 per 
month, which is substantially low especially if the grant is the only source of income for an 
individual or household. 
 
Although social grants may alleviate poverty, they may not necessarily yield the positive results 
for which they are intended (Leibbrandt & Woolard, 2010; Park, Yoon & Henderson, 2007). This 
is because grants tend to have disincentive effects on labour supply by altering the labour market 
behavior of working age individuals, such that individuals look for work less (Leibbrandt & 
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Woolard, 2010). Studies have suggested that social grants may be beneficial to persons with 
disabilities in their prime age, but the same disincentive effects have been found when disability 
grants have been tested (Leibbrandt & Woolard, 2010; Mutasa, 2012). This is because the generous 
amount of benefits distorts work decisions for PWDs as disability benefits are higher than 
unemployment benefits in some developed countries, and even in instances where the benefits are 
low as in the case of South Africa, disability grants have still been found to promote dependency 
and reduce labour supply (Jensen et al., 2005; Gruber, 1996; Mutasa, 2012). The effects of 
disability grants are further clouded by the difficulty in defining disability, which distorts work 
decisions because of the possible subsidizing of early retirement for workers who may not be 
disabled (Gruber, 1996).  
 
The various definitions of disability have also led to challenges in research because of the difficulty 
that arises in identifying the disabled (OECD, 2003; Wolfe & Haveman, 1990). This is because 
many characteristics such as blindness, deafness, activity limitation, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV, 
chronic illness, schizophrenia or bipolar have been classified as disabilities (Wasserman et al., 
2016). In sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge of identifying the disabled and the lack of experience, 
expertise and what constitutes evidence, have similarly contributed to the lack of research in this 
area (Swartz, 2014). The lack of experience and expertise relates to the exclusion of the disabled 
from conducting research, such that their non-disabled counterparts are at the forefront, while that 
which constitutes evidence relates to research methods applied by different scholars which may 
yield different results (Swartz, 2014). In the case of South Africa, the disability prevalence measure 
is based on the degree of difficulty in seeing, hearing, communicating, remembering, walking and 
self-care which may differ from that of other countries because of differences in the classification 
of PWDs (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Despite differences in the definition and classification of 
disability, there exists a body of research on the effects of disability on labour market outcomes. 
 
In terms of the interaction between disability and other labour market determinants, an individual’s 
age may influence disability. The likelihood of developing a disability increases with age but the 
age at which an individual gets disabled has further repercussions on an individual’s employment 
and earnings. Evidence suggests that those who develop disabilities earlier in life have higher 
unemployment rates than those who develop disabilities later, because of reduced investments in 
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education and skills (Loprest & Maag, 2003). In relation to gender and race, women with 
disabilities have poor labour market outcomes compared to women without disabilities while the 
black population suffers from a higher disability prevalence rate than other racial groups (Baldwin 
& Johnson, 1995; Newacheck et al., 2003; Dunlop et al., 2007). PWD’s are also less educated than 
persons without disabilities because of limited education opportunities which have not improved 
even with the introduction of special education schools (Elwan, 1999; Aron & Loprest, 2012). In 
relation to marriage and depression, PWDs are less likely to marry and more likely to suffer from 
depression than their non-disabled counterparts and therefore likely to have lower employment 
rates and earnings especially in the case of employers who perceive married people to be more 
stable. Also, because depression affects productivity, the same poor labour market outcomes are 
likely to be observed amongst PWDs (Morris, Sinclair & DePaulo, 2007; Lerner & Henke, 2008). 
 
In as much as there has been a growing body of research on the effects of disability on labour 
market outcomes, the minimal progress made towards reducing the penalties of having a disability 
raises concern. This is because disability penalties appear to be on the rise compared to other labour 
market discrimination penalties as Berthoud (2008) found that the disability penalty had increased 
over the past three decades, while the gender penalty had reduced over the same period. Policies 
on labour market discrimination for the disabled have therefore proved ineffective and require 
further policy interventions which form the motivation for this study.  
 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
Studies on disability have previously been viewed from a clinical perspective rather than an 
economic or social perspective, which explains the existence of limited research on the economic 
and social impacts of disability. The medical model of disability which implies that the difference 
between PWDs and persons without disabilities is a problem that can be fixed by medical treatment 
has taken centre stage in disability studies, which is different from the social model of disability 
which implies that disability is caused by the disabling barriers of society and not necessarily 
impairment (Oliver, 2013). An emphasis on the social model of disability is therefore paramount 
to the integration and inclusion of PWDs in society, to minimize the negative attitudes and physical 
barriers faced by PWDs. To apply the social model of disability, the social and economic effects 
of disability must however first be understood which this study seeks to analyse.  
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PWDs represent a vulnerable group in society because of the economic and social disadvantages 
they face, but in comparison to other vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women, youth and 
children, research on their economic well-being is significantly absent (Wolfe & Haveman, 1990). 
Despite increases in activities that address the challenges facing the disabled, the lack of research 
has been attributed to the fact that PWDs are less visible than other economically disadvantaged 
groups because they work less, are immobile and sometimes older (Wolfe & Haveman, 1990). The 
lack of objectivity in identifying the disabled in survey data has also contributed to minimal 
research because disability is not clearly defined. Definitions of disability are often broad as some 
definitions restrict it to social conditions, economic conditions and self-perceptions, while other 
definitions apply more stringent measures restricted to specific health conditions or objective 
health measures (Wolfe & Haveman, 1990). Economic research further limits the definition of 
disability to self-reported work limiting health conditions, the ability to meet a defined criterion of 
incapacity and the period for which an individual faces disability (Wolfe & Haveman, 1990). Self-
reported measures may however yield potential measurement errors because disability is 
subjective and therefore does not determine whether an individual is suffering from a long-term 
health problem or whether their disability is work limiting and therefore underestimates the 
number of people in the working age population who are disabled and employed (Jones, 2008; 
Burkhauser et al., 2002). 
 
Disability may also be misreported because of social and economic incentives such that the 
declaration of disability depends on work preferences and the access to disability benefits (Jones, 
2008). This leads to biased measurements of disability because disability becomes a justification 
for non-employment and is subsequently endogenous when performing regressions. Similarly, the 
use of specific health conditions or objective health measures, does not provide information that 
is closely related to work limitations and therefore leads to errors in measurement (Jones, 2008). 
Despite limitations in the measurement of disability in economic research, self-reported measures, 
a defined criterion of incapacity or a combination of both, have been applied to determine the 
effects of disability on labour market outcomes. Hum & Simpson (2015) used a combination of 
both when analysing labour market outcomes for Canadians, while Stapleton, Burkhauser & 
Houtenville (2004) analysed the difference in employment outcomes when disability was defined 
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by work limiting conditions and when it was defined by general activity limitation. These 
differences in measurement further make it difficult for researchers to compare the economic 
effects of having a disability, but do not necessarily negate the findings of research. Such studies 
also allow for the drawing of conclusions to inform policy which further motivates this study. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Through the application of taste-based and statistical discrimination theories, evidence suggests 
that discrimination in the labour market exists particularly in relation to race and gender, but 
limited research exists on the extent to which these inequalities exists for PWDs. Studies in South 
Africa have attempted to explain these inequalities in relation to race and gender as Burger & Jafta 
(2006) found no effect on the narrowing of the wage gap between races in their study on returns 
to race in post-apartheid South Africa, while Kollamparambil & Razak (2016) and Bosch (2015) 
found that females in South Africa earned significantly less than males even though the gap had 
narrowed over time. In the case of PWDs, anecdotal evidence suggests the existence of inequalities 
in labour market outcomes in terms of employment and earnings, but minimal research has been 
done to ascertain the extent to which this is true. Studies on PWDs have been centered on health 
and educational outcomes, or the barriers they face in employment with limited statistical evidence 
explaining this phenomenon (Maja et al., 2011; Gida & Ortlepp, 2007). In cases where statistical 
evidence has been applied, studies on the effects of disability grants have been examined, showing 
disincentive effects on labour market participation (Mutasa, 2012).  
 
Even though there exists data from multiple surveys that can be used for analysis, the effect of 
having a disability on labour market outcomes relative to persons without disabilities in South 
Africa is unknown. Similarly, the effect of different types of disability and how they affect labour 
market outcomes relative to persons without disability has not been tested in the case of South 
Africa. Despite limitations in the measurement of disability from surveys, there is a consensus 
amongst researchers that such data can be used to analyse trends in labour market outcomes for 
PWDs (Burkhauser et al., 2002). Considering the availability of data and the lack of research on 
the effects of disability and disability type on the labour market, there exists a gap which this study 
seeks to fill. As a result, this study seeks to identify the existence of inequalities in labour market 
outcomes by measuring the effect of disability on labour force participation, employment and 
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wages while at the same time identifying how these outcomes manifest across different types of 
disability. The effect of disability grants on participation will also be tested to compare any 
similarities or differences on the disincentive effects of disability grants on labour supply following 
the findings of Mutasa (2012). The motivation for this study is also founded on the right to equal 
opportunities for all persons including PWDs as stipulated in the South African constitution. This 
study will seek to answer the research question “what is the effect of disability, disability type and 
disability grants on labour force participation, employment and wages in South Africa?” 
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The general objective of this study is to identify the effects of having a disability on labour market 
outcomes. The specific objectives of the study are: 
a) To determine the effect of disability on labour force participation, employment and wages 
b) To determine the effect of disability type on labour force participation, employment and wages 
c) To determine the effect of disability grants on labour force participation, employment and 
wages 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study adds to the existing body of literature on disability and labour market outcomes and 
will particularly be significant in its contribution towards identifying the effects of disability type 
on labour market outcomes in South Africa. The sections that follow cover a literature review of 
past studies, the methodology employed in analysing data, a chapter on the findings of the study, 
and concludes with a summary of results, limitations of the study, and recommendations for 
future research.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses theories on labour market discrimination, barriers to the employment of 
persons with disability and the relationship between disability and other labour market 
determinants. It concludes by discussing empirical evidence on the effects of disability, disability 
type and disability grants on labour market outcomes.   
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The fundamental assumption underlying the economic status of PWDs is that they are 
economically disadvantaged because of discrimination in the labour market, which occurs when 
different groups of workers with equal productivity have different mean wages or employment 
opportunities (Beegle & Stock, 2003; Baldwin & Johnson, 2000). Labour market discrimination 
for PWDs has been attributed to both prejudice and the limiting effects of health conditions, where 
the origins of prejudice are purely based on demographic characteristics and the perception that 
PWDs defy cultural norms and standards (Cain, 1986; Hahn, 1988). According to Baldwin & 
Johnson (2000) and Jones (2008), employers are assumed to be prejudiced if they incur disutility 
by hiring persons whom they are prejudiced. In the case of PWDs, the observed lack of labour 
market participation occurs when an employer views disability as an indicator of productivity, 
making labour market participation subjective. This subjectivity can be observed when 
productivity is cited as a barrier to the employment of PWDs in a productivity intense organisation, 
while higher productivity levels are reported for PWDs in a different organisation (Maja et al, 
2011). 
 
The limiting effects of health conditions on the other hand play a role in labour market 
discrimination because prejudice alone without taking into consideration the limiting effects of 
health conditions, overestimates the negative impact of disability when in fact there is the 
possibility that PWDs would not participate in the labour market even in the absence of 
discrimination (Baldwin & Johnson, 2000). Discrimination also plays a reversed role in decision 
making for PWDs who may choose not to participate in the labour market because they already 
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sense that they will be discriminated on (Jones, 2008).  As a result, PWDs do not invest in 
education which leads to low levels of skill which inevitably sets them up to having inferior 
characteristics, ultimately leading to poor labour market outcomes (Jones, 2008). The lack of 
interest in work further influences labour market outcomes for PWDs as observed by the lack of 
interest in work for one third of new enrollees into community based mental health programmes 
(Macias et al., 2001). 
 
Theories on labour market discrimination date as far back as 1957 where two dominant models of 
taste-based and statistical discrimination emerged (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1971). These theories 
laid the foundation for future research but the challenge of not being able to make a clear 
distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination is one that has been faced by many 
researchers (Cahuc et. al., 2014). Studies are more likely to indicate the presence of discrimination 
or measure its magnitude but are not specific as to whether discrimination is based on taste or is 
statistical. In the case of disability, several studies have found the presence of discrimination in 
the labour market but have not explicitly indicated which of the two models apply to their findings 
(Baldwin & Johnson, 2000; Hum & Simpson, 1996; Brown & Emery, 2008). The measurement of 
discrimination in the labour market is further complicated by other econometric problems such as 
the omitted variable bias because of the use of causal relationships which may attribute a difference 
in wages to an individual being part of a discriminated group, without taking into consideration 
the effect of differences in skills or other unobservable characteristics that may be correlated to 
this group (Guryan & Charles, 2013). The fact that unobservable characteristics are in themselves 
unobserved makes the problem of omitted variable bias even more difficult to avoid. 
 
Furthermore, regression and decomposition methods which are used in measuring the extent of 
discrimination in labour markets may control for too little or too much and therefore underestimate 
or overestimate the role of discrimination (Guryan & Charles, 2013). This is because the lack of 
clarity on what characteristics to control for and determining what to manipulate and what remains 
constant requires choosing characteristics that are inherently tied to members of the discriminated 
group, which may be difficult to define (Guryan & Charles, 2013). The use of pre-market factors 
such as education which is endogenous to discrimination also brings about problems of 
endogeneity when used as a control in the wage equation and underestimates the role of 
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discrimination (Cahuc et. al., 2014). Other pre-market factors such as attitudes towards risk and 
social norms may affect earnings as individuals who are risk averse tend to settle for stable jobs 
which pay less, and not taking these factors into consideration, overestimates the role of 
discrimination (Cahuc et. al., 2014).  
 
Selection bias also poses a challenge in measuring labour market discrimination as wages are only 
observed for those who are employed, leaving out the potential earnings of those who are 
unemployed. The results from such studies are often biased because they are not reflective of the 
entire population as this censored population is left out of the regression model (Heckman, 1979).  
Inserting wages of the non-participants into the model or including a participation control variable 
as a regressor in the participation equation are some of the methods that have been developed to 
correct for selection bias. Other mechanisms such as audit, correspondence and experimental 
studies have also been developed to correct the problems of bias (Guryan & Charles, 2013; Cahuc 
et. al., 2014). Audit studies match all other observable characteristics other than those subject to 
discrimination to detect differences in labour market outcomes but have been criticized for their 
difficulty in achieving a perfect match for all relevant attributes (Neumark, 2010).  Correspondence 
studies create fictitious resumes with identical qualifications in response to real job openings, to 
detect different outcomes for discriminated groups but have been criticized for tracking 
intermediate outcomes and for their methods in signaling the race or gender of applicants 
(Neumark, 2010; Guryan & Charles, 2013). The use of experiments however provides more 
reliable results because experimental studies allow for the control and partial measure of 
discriminated traits when they are well designed.  
 
2.1.1 Taste-based discrimination 
Taste-based discrimination occurs when employers, co-workers or customers have an aversion 
towards a certain group and are willing to pay a price to avoid interaction with that group (Guryan 
& Charles, 2013). It can be seen in the wage difference between members of two groups where 
individuals of the discriminated group earn less than the non-discriminated group who are typically 
paid based on their productivity (Cahuc et. al., 2014). With the assumption that the labour market 
is composed of two groups x and y where x represents the discriminated group and y represents 
the non-discriminated group, the wages of the discriminated group can be explained by:  
12 
 
	𝑖)	𝑤%= z – u 
where: 𝑤% = wage of x, z = quantity produced, u = aversion 
While the wages of the non-discriminated group are represented by: 𝑖𝑖)	𝑤' = z 
This means that members of the non-discriminated group earn more than the discriminated group 
because of aversion.  
 
Taste-based discrimination however does not occur in perfect markets because workers in perfect 
markets are paid based on their marginal productivity, such that their wages are not in any way 
different from members of the alternative group (Cahun et. al., 2014). This means that employers 
under perfect competition have no aversion towards members of a particular group and therefore 
allow these members to freely enter the labour market. Under perfect competition 𝑤%= 𝑤'= z. This 
means that in an economy where there is no discrimination, wage differentials between the 
disabled and non-disabled would be statistically insignificant (Hum & Simpson, 1996). Imperfect 
markets on the other hand have a high occurrence of taste-based discrimination because the degree 
of monopoly enjoyed by firms allows them to create barriers to entry for individuals of a certain 
group (Dewey, 1958). Also because of a strong collective bargaining power, they are able to 
implement employment policies that favour a particular group while discriminating another. Low 
wages and low levels of employment for discriminated groups are therefore persistent in imperfect 
markets as they often obtain a lower wage compared to the non-discriminated group.  
 
A study attempting to test the presence of taste-based discrimination by analysing changes in 
ethnic preferences and their effect on admission to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) during 
World War 1, found that the War made German Americans an ethnic minority whose probability 
of being rejected for seats on the NYSE relative to Anglo-Saxons was more than double (Moser, 
2008). A reduction in productivity for German Americans relative to Anglo-Saxons could have 
been a possible explanation for these changes because the War prevented business with Germany, 
but data on the exits of Germans from the NYSE did not indicate this. There was also no decline 
in the number of German applicants which revealed that applicants were instead rejected because 
of the admission process where they were evaluated by remaining committee members who were 
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not driven by higher prices, but by future interactions with applicants and therefore ethnically 
biased (Moser, 2008). Similarly, a study on taste-based discrimination in hiring with geographic 
variation found that an employer was more likely to discriminate against a minority group in 
municipalities which had a negative attitude, especially when hiring individuals in low level 
occupations (Carlsson & Rooth, 2011). 
 
2.1.2 Statistical discrimination 
Statistical discrimination occurs when a decision maker uses easily observable characteristics of a 
broad societal category such as race, gender or ethnicity to determine unobservable characteristics 
of an individual (Fang & Moro, 2011). It is based on rational behavior and asymmetric information 
and occurs when employers assess the expected productivity of a worker using limited information 
which they may obtain from resumes and interviews (Guryan & Charles, 2013). Also, because 
they are aware of the potential employee’s race, gender or ethnicity, employers base their decisions 
on the characteristics of members of these groups and apply these traits to the potential employee. 
The employer’s decision is therefore a weighted average of an individual’s signals and that of the 
productivity of members of the applicant’s group (Guryan & Charles, 2013). This means that the 
more information an employer has on an individual’s characteristics and that of his/her associated 
group, the more the weight the employer places on the information they have.  
 
Statistical discrimination begins when employers evaluate the performance of workers using hiring 
tests where the probability of passing the test is given by the equation: 𝑖𝑖𝑖) Pr{ℎ = ℎ,| 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠} = 33,4(673)	 
The expected productivity of a person who passes the test is given by the equation 𝑖𝑣)	 ℎ,𝜋𝜋 + 𝑝(1 − 𝜋) 
Where h= low productivity, ℎ,= high productivity, 𝜋 = proportion of efficient workers of the 
demographic group who are considered, p = probability of inefficient workers passing the test and 
being wrongly classified as efficient 
 
Wages in the above equation (iv) increase with π which represents the proportion of efficient 
workers in the demographic group who are considered, such that individuals with identical abilities 
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tend to have different wages and career paths because of the average productivity of the group that 
they belong to (Cahuc et. al., 2014). An increase in p which is the probability of inefficient workers 
passing the test and being wrongly classified as efficient, also has a negative effect on the wages 
of the discriminated group.  
 
Employers are said to be statistically discriminating when wages are not correlated with an 
individual’s productivity, which the employer is expected to learn over time, but rather correlated 
with unobservable characteristics (Guryan & Charles, 2013). This explains why individuals of a 
discriminated group persistently earn less than their non-discriminated counterparts even with 
employer learning. The presence of statistical discrimination in labour markets also influences the 
behavior of individuals who may choose not to obtain certain skills when employers discriminate 
against their group despite them having the right qualifications. If a worker’s productivity depends 
on their level of education for example, but employers believe that the proportion of inefficient 
workers in the discriminated group is high, the returns to education are low therefore discouraging 
members of this group from getting an education. When these members choose not to prioritize 
education, the perceived notion of inefficient workers that employers have of this group then 
becomes a reality, such that employers encounter less efficient workers amongst this group.  
 
A study on statistical discrimination and employer’s recruitment practices for low-skilled workers 
found that signals such as old age, immigration status and long-term unemployment played a 
reduced role on the recruitment strategies of employers, compared to signals that indicated soft 
skills and motivation because the former was overrepresented in low-skilled applicants (Bonoli & 
Hinrichs, 2010). Employers were also not allowed to be picky with their hiring strategies because 
of the poor working conditions that surrounded low skilled workers. Soft skills were on the 
contrary regarded as positive signals because formal qualifications did not have a huge bearing on 
low-skilled occupations, while motivation was indicated by applications that were unsolicited 
instead of those that were referred by the public employment service (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010). 
 
Both taste and statistical discrimination account for wage differentials but it is difficult to identify 
which of the two models is an accurate measure as they both have their own limitations. It has also 
become increasingly difficult for scholars to identify which of the two models is more apparent in 
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labour markets as researchers provide evidence of discrimination but fail to justify which of the 
two models apply to their findings. The inability to distinguish between the superiority of these 
two models however does not derail the importance of research in eliminating poor labour market 
outcomes for PWDs.  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
2.2.1 Barriers to the employment of PWDs 
Apart from discrimination, several other factors influence labour market outcomes for PWDs. 
These barriers include low levels of skill amongst PWDs, the physical environment, legislation 
and disability grants. 
 
2.2.1.1 Experience and skills 
PWDs are generally found to have lower levels of education compared to non-disabled persons 
because of limitations to the access of educational opportunities (Elwan, 1999). This lack of 
opportunities for PWDs has predominantly contributed to the association of high rates of disability 
with high levels of illiteracy, low levels of skill and limited access to employment opportunities 
or the occupation of low skilled labour in different sectors of the economy. Hum & Simpson (1996) 
found that men and women without disabilities had higher qualifications than PWDs, as 16% of 
them had a university degree compared to 8% of PWDs. The lack of education and participation 
of PWDs in the labour market has had a significant contribution to the low levels of human capital 
accumulation amongst this group but even in instances where PWDs have been equipped with the 
necessary skills and training, such skills have not been recognized because of the employer’s 
perception towards disability. Shier, Graham & Jones (2009) found that despite formal 
qualifications and experience in crane driving, information technology and the office supply 
industry, employers were reluctant to hire respondents who had epilepsy, a mobility disability and 
a reading disorder as soon as they discovered the potential employee’s disability condition.  
 
In the case of South Africa, the Integrated National Disability Strategy recognizes the lack of 
access to educational opportunities as a binding constraint to the attainment of higher qualifications 
for PWDs as statistics indicated that of those with severe disabilities, only 5.3% had attained higher 
education while 23.8% had no formal education (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Maja et al., (2011) 
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found that most organisations in South Africa cited the lack of formal qualifications as a 
hinderance to the employment of PWDs but for those organisations that hired them, recruitment 
was done at the entry level followed by the provision of study bursaries for PWDs to pursue their 
education. This approach would be a step in the right direction for both policy makers and 
beneficiaries but may not be sustainable for companies with inadequate resources. In instances 
where employers’ attitudes override the experience and skills of PWDs when making recruitment 
decisions, policies should factor in the role of awareness in changing the perception of the public 
towards disability, while at the same time seek to improve the educational qualifications of PWDs. 
 
2.2.1.2 Physical environment 
The physical environment which includes access to buildings, public spaces, transport and 
machinery, plays a big role in the mobility of PWDs. Functional working spaces that cater to the 
needs of PWDs are amongst the many impediments that prevent organisations from hiring PWDs. 
A study on factors affecting employment among people with mobility disabilities found 
employment rates to be lower for people with mobility disabilities compared to that of the general 
population at 34% and 60% respectively (Park, Yoon & Henderson, 2007). Vocational 
rehabilitation services have also been found not to have a significant effect on influencing 
environmental factors that affect the probability of employment of people with mobility 
disabilities, yet mobility and dexterity disabilities are amongst the most common forms of 
disability as revealed by a study on the barriers to employment of disabled people (Goldstone & 
Meager, 2002). These services have instead targeted individuals with more severe disabilities 
failing to influence the probability of employment for persons with mobility disabilities (Park, 
Yoon & Henderson, 2007). A more inclusive work environment therefore requires the 
commitment of employers to build facilities that cater to the mobility needs of PWDs, but evidence 
however suggests that employers are more willing to adjust the physical environment for old 
employees than new recruits thereby creating a barrier to the initial employment of PWDs 
(Goldstone & Meager, 2002). 
 
Other than access to functional working spaces, PWDs face several other environmental barriers. 
A study on the environmental barriers faced by PWDs and persons without disabilities in diverse 
African settings found that persons with disabilities faced more environmental barriers than person 
17 
 
without disabilities (Visagie et al., 2017). Data was collected from respondents in South Africa, 
Namibia, Sudan and Malawi through a self-reported survey where environmental barriers were 
classified into categories consisting of access to products and technology, the natural environment, 
relationships with others, the attitudes of others; and access to systems, policies and services in 
education, health, housing and transport. The most significant difference between persons with 
and without disabilities was observed in the access to transport, health services and access to the 
natural environment. Environmental barriers were further found to be lower for persons with 
higher levels of education, better mental health and those with fewer physical disabilities.  
 
South African studies bear similarities to the findings of studies abroad as organisations indicated 
the lack of disability friendly facilities as a hindrance to the employment of PWDs (Maja et al., 
2011). Mobility access was cited as a great barrier to the employment of PWDs as only a few 
adjustments had been made to accommodate them. This was because organisations considered the 
cost of adjusting facilities to be high. It is however not necessarily true that all adjustments for 
PWDs are expensive as Gida & Ortlepp (2007) found that most organisations in the top 100 
financial times list had moved beyond the argument of cost, to provide reasonable accommodation 
by adjusting their facilities to include ramps and lifts for PWDs. It was however difficult to 
differentiate whether organizations in the top 100 financial times list had adjusted their facilities 
as merely an act of compliance, or out of their willingness and openness to employ PWDs (Gida 
& Ortlepp, 2007). Most organisations also revealed that they would rather employ paraplegics 
because they did not need special equipment to carry out their tasks as do blind or deaf people, 
further revealing the extent of discrimination within the broader disability group (Gida & Ortlepp, 
2007). 
 
2.2.1.3 Legislation 
On the premise that PWD’s experience labour market discrimination, acts of legislation have been 
introduced to prevent its occurrence, but even in their presence, labour market outcomes for the 
disabled remain poor. Legislation plays an important role in protecting the rights of PWDs and 
creating an environment that promotes access to equal opportunities because in its absence, aspects 
of past discriminatory laws remain, failing to meet international human rights standards for PWDs. 
In USA and UK, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Disability Discrimination Act have 
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been enacted to ensure employers adjust their physical environments and recruitment processes to 
cater to the needs of PWDs (Jones, 2008). Legislation without proper implementation may 
however serve as a barrier to the employment of PWDs because of the lack of accountability on 
the part of employers. Acemoglu & Angrist (1998) in their study on the consequences of 
employment protection found that the Americans with Disability Act had a negative impact on the 
employment of PWD’s because of increased costs to employers. 
 
The lack of enforcement on legislation across all sectors further creates a barrier to the employment 
of PWDs as revealed by a study on the barriers to employment for disabled people in the UK. 
Approximately 52% of respondents reported that their organisation had a policy on the 
employment of PWDs, but this was more common in large organisations, the public sector and the 
trade sector, leaving out the private sector and other sectors of the economy (Goldstone & Meager, 
2002). Policies were also more common in organisations with disabled employees than those 
without and fewer organisations had a specific policy on the recruitment of disabled persons. 
Furthermore, 31% of respondents reported that their organisation had a formal written policy on 
the recruitment of PWDs but only 19% encouraged such applications (Goldstone & Meager, 2002). 
Line managers were also found not to be aware of such policies when compared to human resource 
specialists which demonstrated the lack of awareness on legislation and negative attitude towards 
the employment of PWDs.  
 
Several Acts of parliament have also been passed in South Africa including the Code of Good 
Practice on the Employment of People with Disabilities to promote fair treatment of PWDs in the 
workplace (Republic of South Africa, 2002). As these laws are not legally binding, employers are 
not at fault for failing to implement such proposed legislation. The fact that employers have the 
discretion to determine what constitutes unjustified hardship on their part when deciding to employ 
people from a designated group, shows the extent to which legislation may prove ineffective (Maja 
et al., 2011). It has further been observed that organisations in South Africa generally have laws 
that promote equality in the workplace but do not have specific policies on the employment of 
PWDs (Maja et al., 2011).  
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2.2.1.4 Disability grants 
In the face of labour market handicaps and in the presence of sound economic and social policies, 
disability grants promote inclusion for PWDs because of the impact they have on poverty 
alleviation. Disability grants can however not be relied on as the only source of income for PWDs 
because they are not sustainable and do not fully embody the idea of inclusion. Johannsmeier 
(2007) proposed an integrated approach to poverty elevation and inclusion for PWDs which 
required cooperation from the government, the private sector and non-governmental organisations, 
such that disability programmes formed part of the development programmes targeted at 
eradicating poverty and exclusion. This was after their study revealed that PWDs used their 
disability grants to pay extra to access transport services because they needed a guide in cases 
where they were blind, or someone to push their wheelchairs in cases where they could not walk 
(Johannsmeier, 2007). These extra payments placed PWDs at a greater risk of poverty compared 
to persons without disabilities especially in instances where they had similar incomes.  
 
Disability grants were also found to have the effect of income dilution in cases where the grant 
was used by a large household as the only source of income. This simultaneously had a negative 
effect on the benefits of disability grants because the amount spent on disability-related costs was 
limited (Johannsmeier, 2007). In terms of labour market outcomes, disability grants tend to have 
disincentive effects on labour supply because they serve as an injection of non-labour income. A 
study on disability grants and labour force participation in South Africa found that the receipt of a 
disability grant reduced the probability of labour force participation by 22.3%, with the 
disincentive effect declining to 21.6% when restricted to men and 23.3% in the case of women 
(Mutasa, 2012). The true labour supply effect of the disability grant was however undetermined 
because data could not control for the severity of disability between those that received the grant 
and those who did not. Other than social transfers from the government, grants from family 
members and other relatives also influence the probability of employment for PWDs as individuals 
with higher levels of support are least likely to be employed than those with lower levels of support.  
Park, Yoon & Henderson (2007) found that individuals who received material support from family, 
friends and others were least likely to be employed because it lessened their economic hardship 
and therefore lacked the motivation to work. 
 
20 
 
2.2.2 Relationship between disability and other labour market determinants   
2.2.2.1 Relationship between disability and age 
Studies have indicated that an individual’s age affects their labour market outcomes because 
earnings are attached to work experience, which tends to increase with age (Luong & Hebert, 
2009). Older people are therefore more likely to earn more than younger people, but this may be 
affected by the likelihood of developing a disability. According to Gerschick (2000) and Loprest 
& Maag (2003) disability was found to progress with age but the disability onset age had an 
influence on an individual’s employment outcome as individuals who developed disabilities at an 
earlier age had a lower likelihood of employment compared to persons without disabilities. This 
was because of the difference in educational outcomes for persons with early onsets of disability 
who had reduced investments in education and skills relative to persons without disabilities 
(Loprest & Maag, 2003). When early onset disability was however compared to late onset 
disability, higher rates of employment were observed amongst those with earlier onset, after 
education, demographics, severity of disability and receipt of disability grants were controlled for 
(Loprest & Maag, 2003).  This was because individuals with earlier onsets of disability chose 
careers that were more accommodative than those who developed disabilities at an older age. 
 
When education was however used as a predictor of wages, the outcomes were favorable for 
individuals with later onsets of disability. Hollenbeck & Kimmel (2008) found greater returns to 
education for individuals who became disabled after the age of 25 compared to those who became 
disabled earlier in life when studying the returns to education for males by disability and age of 
disability. For those with early onsets of disability, there was no advantage on the returns to 
education because of the quality and quantity of education received. Individuals with later onsets 
had however acquired the desired knowledge and skills which allowed them to earn more even 
after becoming disabled. Their higher education qualifications further allowed them to change jobs 
and work for employers who accommodated their needs. Despite the positive returns to education 
for persons with later onsets of disability or those who had earlier onsets but chose more 
accommodative careers, the difference in wages remained wide for both groups relative to their 
non-disabled counterparts (Loprest & Maag, 2003; Hollenbeck & Kimmel, 2008). 
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2.2.2.2 Disability and gender 
Gender has been identified as a predictor of labour market outcomes following indications of the 
presence of discrimination when examining wage gaps between men and women across different 
studies. A study on sex discrimination on restaurant hiring indicated that women were less likely 
to be called for interviews or receive job offers in higher earning restaurants compared to men, 
while women in the USA were found to earn less than their male counterparts even though the 
gender wage gap had been declining over time (Neumark, Bank & Van Nort, 1996; Blau, 1996). 
Given these negative outcomes, the possibility of double discrimination for women with 
disabilities arises as PWDs are already disadvantaged in the labour market. Baldwin & Johnson 
(1995) provided evidence of the double burden faced by women with disabilities arising from both 
gender and disability-related discrimination when they found that the wage difference between 
men and disabled women was three times more than the wage difference between disabled women 
and women without disabilities.  
 
Stapleton, Burkhauser & Houtenville (2004) provide further evidence of the penalties faced by 
women with disabilities when their findings indicated that in 1980, employment rates grew for 
both women with disabilities and those without, but only continued to grow for women without 
disabilities. Women with disabilities instead faced negative growth rates as their employment rates 
declined by 1% within the same period. Some scholars however argue that the negative effects of 
disability are not only experienced by women but are experienced by both genders. A study on the 
economic well-being of disabled women found no significant difference in the fall of earnings, 
income and consumption for households headed by both disabled men and women after disability 
onset (Meyer & Mok, 2014). Even though women were more likely to develop a disability by the 
age of forty-five than men were, the effect of having a disability on family income and 
consumption was lower in women than it was in men. This was because the contribution of 
women’s earnings to family income was small and therefore had a smaller impact on family 
income and consumption after the onset of disability. These findings may however not hold in 
households where disabled women are the sole providers 
 
In the case of South Africa where disability prevalence is higher in women than it is in men and 
wages are lower for women than they are for men, the double burden of discrimination faced by 
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women with disabilities raises concern because more women than men experience a fall in 
earnings, income and consumption (Statistics South Africa, 2011; Bosch, 2015). Furthermore, in 
households where disabled women are the sole contributors to the family’s income, the 
repercussions of double discrimination are even worse. 
 
2.2.2.3 Disability and race 
Disability prevalence tends to be higher in the Black population more than in any other race as 
evidence suggests that this phenomenon holds true. Newacheck et al. (2003) and Dunlop et al. 
(2007) found disability prevalence to be higher in Black children more than in White children, 
while African American adults and Hispanics were found to be at a higher risk of developing 
disabilities than White adults. These findings were similar to those of Statistics South Africa 
(2011) where it was indicated that disability prevalence was higher in Black South Africa more 
than in any other race. In terms of labour market outcomes, the relationship between race and 
employment differs across race. Studies revealed that Black people earned less than any other race 
across different racial groups as Altonji & Blank (1999) found that the Black population earned 
less than the white and Hispanic population when estimating differentials in labour market 
outcomes across race and gender. Burger & Jafta (2006) also found no significant effect on the 
narrowing of the wage gap across race in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
Given that disability prevalence is higher in the Black population than it is across other races, and 
that negative employment outcomes are more likely in the Black population than in any other race, 
Black individuals who are disabled are likely to suffer a double disadvantage when estimating their 
labour market outcomes. Moodley & Graham (2015) found that Black disabled people faced a 
double disadvantage in employment outcomes while studying the importance of intersectionality 
of disability and gender in South Africa. Furthermore, the repercussions were found to be worse 
for Black women with disabilities as White women with disabilities were just as likely to be 
employed as Black men without disabilities. The idea of a double oppression for Black people 
with disabilities has however elicited debate amongst researchers who are of the idea that it should 
not be viewed in isolation (Stuart, 1992). This is to mean that research on Black disabled people 
should take into consideration other related areas of research because both White and Black 
disabled people experience discrimination, even though the effect is smaller for the white race 
23 
 
because they are easily accepted by society (Stuart, 1992).  Whether the double disadvantage of 
being Black and having a disability is viewed from a simultaneous or isolated perspective, it is 
clear that in terms of labour market outcomes, Black people have negative labour market outcomes 
than other races which similarly applies to PWDs relative to persons without disabilities. 
 
2.2.2.4 Disability and education 
Education has the potential to influence an individual’s economically productive life especially at 
a young age, because of the role schools play in assisting students to successfully transition to 
post-secondary education, job training and employment (Aron & Loprest, 2012). For persons with 
limited opportunities such as PWDs, education plays a central role in changing the persistent 
negative labour market outcomes they face. The failure of education systems to promote equity 
and inclusion however makes it difficult for PWDs to break the cycle of poor education and labour 
market outcomes.  Lazarus & Howell (2003) argue that inclusion should not only focus on creating 
changes at lower levels of education which policy has broadly emphasized, but also at higher levels 
of education because of the importance of higher education in developing skills and creating a 
knowledge base that is central to a vibrant economy. Instead of seeking to increase access and 
participation for disabled students through less discriminatory admission policies, a deeper look 
into the experience of such learners in higher education institutions should provide a better 
estimate of their ability to succeed and complete their education (Lazarus & Howell, 2003).  
 
The success of disabled students however depends on the ability of higher education systems to 
change their structures which have been criticized for being less accommodative to their needs. In 
most South African higher education institutions with disability units, these units have been found 
not to cater to all types of impairment and in instances where they were absent, disabled students 
felt isolated and found it difficult to integrate (Mutanga, 2017). Special education schools have 
since emerged to cater to the needs of individuals with different types of impairment and to 
compensate for the limitations in economic and social opportunities for the disabled. Such policies 
are often cited as progressive but may not be beneficial to all disabled individuals because of the 
high financial costs attached to them (Lazarus & Howell, 2003). Learners in such schools were 
also found not to be prepared for the work environment because their curriculum was not rigorous 
(Lazarus & Howell, 2003). 
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Evidence further suggests that PWDs still have poor outcomes in post-secondary enrollment and 
employment compared to their peers without disabilities. Aron & Loprest (2012) found that the 
likelihood of dropping out of high school was higher for PWDs than it was for individuals without 
disabilities, as only 46% of PWDs graduated from high school compared to 75% of persons 
without disabilities. Such low rates of graduation for PWDs lead to lower chances of enrollment 
in higher education and those that make it to higher education institutions, find it harder to adjust 
because of the lack of reasonable accommodations. Sachs & Schreuer (2011) found that although 
there was no significant difference in the education achievements of people with disabilities and 
those without in higher institutions of learning, the lower grades for PWDs had the ability to 
influence graduate admission and employment in competitive institutions. Given that the 
attainment of higher education affects employment outcomes, PWDs are therefore less likely to 
be employed because of their low participation rates in post-secondary education.  
  
2.2.2.5 Disability and depression 
Depression has a negative impact on employment and earnings because people with depression 
have higher absenteeism and deficits in work performance which affects productivity. A study on 
work performance of employees with depression found absenteeism to be three times higher in 
people with depression, while work limitations were found to be four times higher for those with 
depression than those without (Lerner et al., 2010). Lerner & Henke (2008) similarly found higher 
rates of unemployment and high absenteeism costs amongst people with depression that cost 
between $36.6 billion and $51.5 billion at national level when studying depression, job 
performance and work productivity. In terms of earnings and number of hours worked, individuals 
suffering from depression were found to earn less and work fewer hours, but even when present at 
work, their performance and at-work productivity was affected by depression (Lerner & Henke, 
2008). 
 
Evidence suggests that people with physical disabilities are more likely to suffer from depression 
than people without disabilities because disability creates stress which is a high-risk factor for 
depression. Noh et al., (2016) argue that new onsets of disability force individuals to adjust their 
daily activities which causes them strain and increases their risk for depression. Turner & Noh 
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(1988) agree with these findings as their study indicated that physical disability was a high-risk 
factor for depression regardless of age, gender, education, marital status, income level or area of 
residence. Those with physical disabilities were also found to be three times more likely to suffer 
from depression than people without disabilities. Given that depression has a negative impact on 
employment and earnings, and that people with physical disabilities are more likely to suffer from 
depression than those without disabilities, then PWDs are more likely to experience negative 
labour market outcomes. Lerner et al. (2010) suggest vocational interventions as a means of 
reducing work stress for persons suffering from depression but further considerations need to be 
given to PWDs because their depression stems from functional limitations. More accommodative 
workspaces are therefore likely to reduce stress inducing factors for people with disability and 
reduce their risk of depression.   
 
2.2.2.6 Disability and marital status 
An individual’s marital status has the potential to influence the employment decisions of an 
employer in both negative and positive aspects, depending on the employer’s perception towards 
marriage and productivity. Some employers perceive that single people are willing to work for 
longer hours because they have fewer responsibilities, while other employers prefer married people 
because being single is associated with less responsibility, less maturity and less stability (Morris, 
Sinclair & DePaulo, 2007; Spence, 1987). Married women with children are at an even greater 
disadvantage because evidence suggests that they are likely to earn less than women without 
children (Anderson, Binder & Krause, 2002). For PWDs, the probability of getting married is 
lower than it is for people without disabilities because of the aversion and prejudice PWDs face 
from persons without disabilities. Hahn (1981) found that individuals with visible physical 
disabilities found it harder to find marital partners because of the stigma attached to disability 
which may have been influenced by cultural taboos or not being able to fit into the idea of what 
society considered to be attractive.  
 
The fear of rejection by non-disabled persons when PWDs showed interest in building 
relationships beyond friendship, also significantly reduced the chances of PWDs getting married, 
and for those that were able to form relationships, the non-disabled partners were sometimes 
thrown off balance when tested by unforeseen obstacles especially when the relationship was 
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conducted as if disability did not exist (Hahn, 1981). Meyer & Mok (2014) similarly found that 
women with early onsets of disability were less likely to marry than those without and that women 
with disabilities fared poorly in marriage than did their male counterparts because their disability 
was associated with higher divorce rates. All these factors affect the social acceptability of PWDs 
in a negative way and the economic loss suffered by those with work limiting conditions further 
prevents them from getting married as they are not able to support a family (Hahn, 1981). Given 
that PWDs are less likely to marry than their non-disabled counterparts, their labour market 
outcomes are affected in instances where employers prefer married individuals over unmarried 
individuals. Also, in instances where employers prefer unmarried individuals over those who are 
married, PWDs are still at a greater disadvantage because of the barriers that prevent them from 
getting into the job market such as discrimination, the level of skill, the physical environment and 
legislation (Baldwin & Johnson, 2000; Hum & Simpson, 1996; Park, Yoon & Henderson, 2007; 
Acemoglu & Angrist, 1998). 
 
2.2.3 International studies 
Studies both locally and abroad have found negative effects of disability, disability type and 
disability grants on labour market outcomes as PWDs were found to have lower participation rates, 
employment rates and earnings. Kidd et al., (2000) found a participation rate of 34% for PWDs 
compared to 84% for persons without disabilities when anlaysing the effects of disability on British 
males. This study used a probit model to determine the difference in labour force participation 
between the disabled and able-bodied using survey data from the British Labour Force Survey. 
The traditional Blinder method was also used to decompose differences in wages between PWDs 
and able-bodied individuals and found that PWDs earned 13% less than persons without 
disabilities. Goldstone & Meager (2002) also found that the unemployment rate for PWDs was 
more than double that of non-disabled persons at 9% and 4% respectively despite the legalization 
of the Disability Discrimination Act and the implementation of several disability programmes in 
the UK. This difference in labour market outcomes was also found in Canada where labour force 
participation was estimated to be 30% lower for PWDs relative to persons without disabilities and 
that the penalties of earnings for PWDs was 21% to 50% lower than for persons without disabilities 
(Brown & Emery, 2008). Data from the Participation and Activity Limitation Survey was used 
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and a probit model, an OLS regression model and a Heckman two-stage estimation model were 
applied to determine the impact of disability on earnings and labour force participation.  
 
The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics also found that only 17.9% of PWDs were employed 
compared to 65.3% of persons without disabilities, which is consistent with data from as early as 
1990, where a decline in employment rates for PWDs was observed amidst remarkable economic 
growth (United States Department of Labor, 2017; Stapleton, Burkhauser & Houtenville, 2004). 
In addition to the low employment rates faced by PWDs, evidence further suggests that PWDs are 
most likely to be employed in part time positions as a study on the factors affecting employment 
among people with mobility disabilities in South Korea revealed that only 13.2% of the disabled 
had full time positions (Park, Yoon & Henderson, 2007). Hum & Simpson (1996) provide further 
evidence of work limitations for PWDs compared to their non-disabled counterparts as it was 
estimated that on average persons without disabilities worked for 38.6 weeks per year while those 
with disabilities worked for only 25.5 weeks. In terms of unemployment, the average period of 
unemployment for PWDs was 22.9 weeks while that of persons without disability was 15.7 weeks 
which indicated that it was more difficult for PWDs to find employment. PWDs were also found 
to earn less by 37% compared to persons without disabilities. Evidence further suggests that PWDs 
are underrepresented in high paying managerial and professional jobs but overrepresented in low 
paying manual jobs, and the manufacturing sector, which explains the existence of low wages 
amongst PWDs (Kidd et al., 2000). The existence of low wages explains the inability of PWDs to 
own assets compared to their non-disabled counterparts, which places them at the lower end of the 
economic ladder. 
 
Studies have indicated that the type and severity of disability influence the probability of 
employment for PWDs. Persons with psychological disabilities bear the least likelihood of 
employment while those with hearing and physical disabilities are more likely to be employed. A 
study on employment opportunities for persons with different types of disability found that the 
probability of employment was higher for persons with hearing disabilities while those with 
psychological disabilities were least likely to be employed (Boman et al., 2015). The study 
controlled for differences in gender, age, ethnic background, level of education, self-related 
workability and residential region, whilst applying logistic regression to calculate odd ratios. The 
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high likelihood of employment for persons with hearing disabilities was attributed to the fact that 
hearing loss progressed with age and as such, people with hearing disabilities were not hindered 
from entering the labour market earlier in life (Boman et al., 2015). Jensen et al., (2005) also found 
the effect on employment to be smaller for persons with hearing disabilities compared to other 
disability types and the total employment effect did not vary with the severity of their hearing 
disability.  
 
Kidd et al., (2000) similarly found that individuals with physical disabilities were more likely to 
be employed than those with psychological or learning difficulties when analysing labour market 
participation of British males. Individuals with psychological disabilities were less likely to be 
employed because of the perception employers had towards different types of disability. 
Employers perceived it easier to employ those with physical disabilities than those with 
psychological disabilities (Boman et al., 2015). Given that investments in education have the 
potential to counter the negative effects of the type of disability on employment, the same did not 
apply to persons with psychological disabilities because their likelihood of employment remained 
low even after differences in the level of education were accounted for. Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference in employment outcomes between persons with a high school qualification 
and those with higher education which meant that other factors such as the physical environment, 
the lack of support from education providers and a different labour market policy programme did 
not prepare PWDs with the necessary transition into the labour market (Boman et al., 2015). 
 
In relation to wages, the type of disability was also found to have an impact on the differences in 
wages as a study in the US on labour market discrimination against men found lower wages in 
workers who had more functional limitations compared to those with fewer limitations. Baldwin 
& Johnson (2000) in estimating the effects of wage discrimination by partly attributing differences 
to productivity and partly to discrimination and residual effects, found large productivity wage 
differentials between disabled and non-disabled men while also finding physical limitations to be 
significant in explaining wage differentials. These physical limitations were taken into 
consideration to avoid overestimating the effect of disability on wages. Hum & Simpson (2015) 
also found that the earnings gap further widened as the severity of disability increased after 
earnings were found to decline when the level of severity of disability increased. 
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The severity of disability also has an influence on the probability of employment as studies indicate 
that the probability of employment decreases with the greater the severity of disability. A study in 
New Zealand found that individuals with disabilities had a lower likelihood of full-time 
employment with the probability of employment diminishing as the severity of disability 
increased, when controlling for age, gender, marital status, parental status and level of education 
(Jensen et al., 2005). The study estimated a counterfactual which was compared to the actual 
employment outcomes of PWDs and the severity of disability was measured by asking respondents 
whether they could do an action easily, with difficulty or not at all and assigned scores of 0, 1 and 
2. Results indicated that as the severity of disability increased, the gap between the expected level 
of employment and actual employment widened. Park, Yoon & Henderson (2007) similarly found 
a higher probability of employment in people with less severe disabilities while assessing factors 
that affected employment among people with mobility disabilities in South Korea. Hum & 
Simpson (1996) found that earnings, the number of hours worked, and hourly wages decreased as 
the severity of disability increased while Meyer & Mok (2014) found that a drop in the number of 
annual hours worked in the severely chronic group after disability onset was four times that of the 
average disabled group. 
 
2.2.4 South African studies 
Striking similarities exist in South Africa albeit the situation being more severe as a study on the 
employment of people with disabilities found that out of 19 organisations in South Africa’s top 
100, 13 of them had below 1% PWD representation (Gida & Ortlepp, 2007). Despite the 
introduction of several labour market policies to favour the employment of PWDs, the actual 
numbers of those employed do not correlate. In the hospitality sector, the lack of awareness on 
disability contributed to the poor implementation of legislation that governed the employment of 
PWDs (Smit, 2012). The Commission for Employment Equity also reported that only 1% of PWDs 
were employed in 2017, a stark revelation of the status of employment for PWDs in South Africa.  
Reports further indicate that the degree of disability has greater ramifications on the level of 
income such that the more severe the disability, the lower the level of income (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011). PWDs in South Africa generally earn less than persons without disabilities and the 
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type of disability further influences an individual’s income, as those with sight disabilities are 
reported to earn more than other types of disability (Statistics South Africa, 2011).  
 
2.3 Summary of Literature Review 
This chapter highlighted the underlying theories that explain discrimination based on taste and 
statistics, and explained the challenges faced by researchers in distinguishing the difference 
between the two.  It further highlighted the econometric complications around the measurement of 
labour market discrimination such as the problems of the omitted variable bias, selection bias and 
endogeneity, which may in one way or the other affect the estimation of results.   
 
The empirical evidence in this chapter highlighted the barriers to the employment of PWDs which 
was attributed to the lack of experience and skills, environmental factors, legislation and access to 
disability grants. Past studies were also reviewed on the relationship between disability and other 
labour market determinants such as age, gender, race, level of education, marital status and 
depression. In relation to the effects of disability, disability type and disability grants, there has 
been compelling evidence from international studies on the inequalities in labor force participation, 
wages and unemployment, but evidence in relation to the South African labour market remains 
limited. Studies in South Africa have instead focused on inequalities based on race and gender, 
and in instances where literature on PWD’s exist, this literature has focused on health and 
educational outcomes or the barriers faced in employment with limited statistical evidence 
explaining this phenomenon (Burger & Jafta, 2006; Kollamparambil & Razak, 2016; Bosch ,2015; 
Maja et al., 2011; Gida & Ortlepp, 2007). This means that the effect of having a disability on 
labour market outcomes relative to persons without disabilities in South Africa is unknown. The 
effect of disability type on labour market outcomes is also unknown, while the effect of disability 
grants on labour market outcomes has not been fully explored. This is the gap that this study seeks 
to fill. 
 
Similarly, past studies have used OLS regression models, probit models and Heckman two-stage 
estimation models to determine the difference in labour force participation, employment and wages 
between the disabled and able-bodied. This study is unique in that it attempts to explain the effects 
of disability, disability type and disability grants on labour market outcomes using a panel dataset 
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and uses specification tests to determine which model out of a POLS, a random effects model and 
a fixed effects model best describes the dataset. The use of a POLS model may present the 
possibility of unobserved heterogeneity but will be addressed by applying a random effects and 
fixed effects model to eliminate any unobserved heterogeneity. This addresses the challenge of the 
omitted variable bias which has been cited as a shortcoming of econometric models. To circumvent 
the problem of selection bias which econometric models have been faulted for and may be present 
in POLS and random effects models, this study will employ the use of an inverse mills ratio in its 
regression equations to account for selection bias. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sources of data used for analysis and the methods used to analyse the 
effects of disability, disability type and disability grants on labour force participation, employment 
and wages. It also explains the variables used for analysis and how they were coded for purposes 
of this study.  
 
3.1 Data 
This study used data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) which is a survey on 
individuals living in South Africa and their households. NIDS data was first collected in 2008 
where the total number of individuals successfully interviewed was 28 226. This number increased 
to 34 085 in the second wave, 37 397 in the third wave and 42 337 in the fourth wave. Data from 
all four waves was used to compare the effects of disability and disability type on labour market 
outcomes. This was in line with the broader objectives of NIDS which seeks to understand the 
changing face of poverty for individuals living in South Africa, which PWDs are particularly 
susceptible to. Data from the adult, child and proxy questionnaires was appended to increase the 
sample size and data was dropped for variables where responses were missing or where individuals 
refused to give information. This was done to ensure a clean dataset by avoiding white noise, and 
to balance the panel dataset. STATA statistical software was similarly used to perform 
econometric analysis. 
 
The NIDS questionnaire captures information on disability status by asking the question “Do you 
have any other major illnesses or disability not mentioned above? Information on disability type 
is captured by asking a follow up question to the question on disability “If yes, what are they?” 
The options for the different disability types are captured under the category physically 
handicapped, problems with sight, hearing and speech, psychological or psychiatric disorder, 
HIV/AIDS, Epilepsy/fits, Emphysema, Alzheimers disease and other. 
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3.2 Model specification 
This paper estimated three effects of disability on labour market outcomes for individuals over 
time using panel data analysis from wave 1 to wave 4. The first part measured the effect of 
disability on labour market outcomes, the second part measured the effect of different types of 
disability on labour market outcomes and the third part measured the effect of disability grants on 
labour market outcomes. Labour market outcomes were limited to participation, employment and 
wages and to determine the effects of disability, disability type and disability grants, three models 
were estimated; a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares model, a random effects model and a fixed 
effects model.   
 
3.2.1 Pooled ordinary least squares model (POLS)  
Pooled data combines a time series of cross sections where observations are repeated on fixed units 
and allows one to observe variations in observations over time. It is advantageous because it deals 
with the problem of few observations that make it difficult to analyse the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables because of the potential of explanatory variables to exceed 
the degrees of freedom (Podesta, 2002). This is especially true in the case of disability where the 
sample size is small given that approximately 10% of the sample population in the NIDS data set 
was disabled.  
 
The analysis was done in three steps where the first step accounted for the decision of PWDs to 
participate in the labour market. The second step estimated the effect of disability on employment 
in recognition of the fact that the decision to participate in the labour market does not necessarily 
lead to employment especially in the case of South Africa where unemployment rates are high 
(Commission of Employment Equity, 2017). The third step determined the Mincerian wage 
regression model to measure the effect of disability on wages.  
 
The model used to measure the effect of disability on labour force participation was represented 
by the Ordinary Least Squares equation below: 𝑌? = α + 𝛽6𝑋6 +	𝛽C𝑋C + 𝜀 ………………………………………………………………......(1) 
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Equation (1) is a binary dependent variable model where 𝑌? takes the value of 1 if an individual is 
in the labour force and takes the value of 0 if the individual is not in the labour force. 𝑋6 is a 
dummy variable which will take the value of 1if an individual is disabled and 0 if they are not 
disabled, 𝑋C is a vector of explanatory variables used to determine the probability of participating 
in the labour market in this case age, gender, race, education, marital status and disability grants, 
while 𝜀 is the error term. 
 
The effect of disability on employment was represented by: 𝑌? = α + 𝛽6𝑋6 +	𝛽C𝑋C + 𝜀 ………………………………………………………………......(2) 
 
Equation (2) is a binary dependent variable model where 𝑦? takes the value of 1 when an individual 
is employed and takes the value of 0 if the individual is not employed. 𝑋6 is a dummy variable 
which will take the value of 1if an individual is disabled and 0 if they are not disabled, 𝑋C is a 
vector of explanatory variables used to determine the probability of employment as mentioned in 
equation (1) 
 
The effect of disability on wages was represented by: ln 𝑌? = α + 𝛽6𝑋6 +	𝛽C𝑋C + 𝜀 ……………………………………………………………...…...(3) 
 
Equation (3) is the Mincerian wage regression model where 𝑦? represents the log of monthly 
wages, 𝑋6	represents a dummy variable which will take the value of 1 if an individual is disabled 
and 0 if an individual is not, 𝑋C is a vector of explanatory variables that determine wages as 
mentioned in equation (1). The Mincerian Wage regression model was used because of its ability 
to capture how the labour market rewards productivity attributes and accounts for income 
inequality (Mincer, 1975) 
 
The effect of disability type on labour force participation, employment and wages was represented 
by the equation: 𝑌? = α + 𝛽6𝑋6 +	𝛽C𝑋C + 𝛽H𝑋H +	𝛽I𝑋I +	𝛽J𝑋J + 𝜀…………………….……….………….....(4) 
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Where 𝑋6 is a dummy variable which will take the value of 1 if the individual is physically 
handicapped and 0 if the individual is not physically handicapped, 𝑋C will take the value of 1 if 
the individual has hearing, seeing and speech disabilities and 0 if not, 𝑋H will take the value of 1 
if the individual is mentally disabled and 0 if they are not mentally disabled, 𝑋I will take the value 
of 1 if the individual has epilepsy/fits, emphysema or alzheimers and 0 if they do not. 𝑋J is a vector 
of explanatory variables used to determine the probability of participation, employment and wages 
which in this case represents age, gender, race, education, marital status and disability grants. 
 
3.2.2 Random effects and fixed effects model 
There is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity bias in the POLS model, which is the presence 
of individual specific unobserved characteristics. This may lead to the study yielding spurious 
results if the unobserved person specific characteristics are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, leading to endogeneity bias. For example, given that the onset of disability may vary for 
different individuals such that some people are disabled from when they are young while others 
may develop disability after acquiring education and skills, the effects on labour market outcomes 
will be different. The onset of disability in the NIDS data set is not measured and is over and above 
correlated with education which explains labour market outcomes. Similarly, some PWDs may 
have low self-esteem and decide not to participate in the labour market while their counterparts 
may be more focused and take advantage of opportunities leading to different labour market 
outcomes. Furthermore, the fact that there exist different types of disability, the effects of these 
disability types on labour market outcomes may vary which this study seeks to further determine.  
 
To address the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity, this study will apply the random effects 
and fixed effects model which eliminate unobserved heterogeneity as shown below: 
 
Random effects model 𝑌?K = β𝑋?K + α + 𝑢?K + 𝜀?K…………………………………………………………………..……..(5) 
 
Fixed effects model 𝑌?K = β𝑋?K + α + 𝑢?K………………………………………………………………………………(6) 
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The problem however with the fixed effects model is that it may omit variables that are consistent 
over time. This can be corrected by introducing an interaction term between each explanatory 
variable, and a continuous variable is created as shown below: 𝜀?K = 𝑢? + 𝑣K + 𝑤?K……………………………………………………………………………...(7) 
 𝑢? is the unobservable individual effect of error; 𝑣K is the unobservable time effect of error; 𝑤?K is 
the purely random component of error. The unobservable effect of error measures ability, 
motivation, self-esteem and other innate attributes that are person specific which cause unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. The unobservable time effect variable accounts for unobservable shocks such 
as government policies that may affect earning during the observed periods. 
 
3.2.3 Specification tests 
To test which model best fit the NIDS data set between pooled, random and fixed effects, 
specification tests were performed. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity was performed 
to determine which model was better between the pooled or random effects model. Under this 
model, the null hypothesis states that variances across entities is zero meaning that there is no 
significant difference across units. When the p-value is less than 5% the null hypothesis is therefore 
rejected. The Hausman test was also performed to determine which model between the random 
effects and the fixed effects best suit the dataset. Under this model, the null hypothesis states that 
the random effects model is the appropriate model and is rejected when the p-value is less than 
5%. This means that in cases where the p-value is less than 5% the fixed effects model would be 
the most appropriate model. 
 
3.3 Data coding and manipulation 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
Labour force participation was represented by individuals who were unemployed discouraged, 
unemployed strict and those who were employed. A dummy variable was created for labour force 
participation where 1 represented individuals who participated in the labour market and 0 
represented those that did not participate. Employment was represented by an individual’s 
employment status for which a dummy variable was created to indicate 1 for individuals who were 
employed and 0 for those who were unemployed, while those who were not economically active 
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were dropped from the sample. Wages were represented by an individual’s gross income from 
their primary occupation and the log of income was created to represent wages.  
 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
The variables used to explain the effects of disability and disability type on participation, 
employment and wages were age, gender, race, education, marital status, disability, disability type 
and disability grants.  The choice of variables was because they had predominantly been mentioned 
as determinants of employment and income in a wide array of literature (Jensen et al., 2005; Brown 
& Emery, 2008). These variables also allowed the results of this study to be compared with other 
studies. 
 
The age of the sample population was individuals between the age of 15 and 64 because they 
formed the working age population in South Africa. Race included the African, Coloured, Asian 
and White population.  
 
For the education variable, the years of education were recoded to represent: 
• 1 for individuals who had no education to grade seven 
• 2 represented individuals who had achieved grade 8 to grade 11 
• 3 represented individuals who had achieved grade 12 
• 4 represented those who had achieved a diploma 
• 5 represented individuals who had attained a degree or higher.  
A dummy variable was created for marital status where 1 represented married individuals and 0 
represented all those who were living with a partner, widowed, divorced or separated or those 
who were never married. For disability and disability grants, dummy variables were created where 
1 represented those who were disabled while 0 represented those who were not disabled and 1 
represented those who received a grant and 0 represented those who did not receive a grant.  
 
The different types of disability were coded into four categories: 
• The first category represented 1 for people who were physically handicapped and 0 for 
those who were not 
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• The second represented 1 for people with seeing, hearing and speech disabilities and 0 for 
people without. 
• The third category represented 1 for people with psychological/psychiatric disorders and 
0 for those without 
• The fourth category represented 1 for people with epilepsy/fits, emphysema, Alzheimer’s 
disease and other disabilities while 0 represented those without. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of the study which had the objective of analysing the effects of 
disability, disability type and disability grants on labour market outcomes. The discussion includes 
descriptive statistics, results from the specification tests which determined the model that was the 
most appropriate, and interpretations of the regression analysis for the panel dataset. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics were used to explain the variables under study as summarized on table 1 
below.  
4.1.1 Summary statistics of regression variables 
The average age of the sample population was 34 years old with the oldest being 65 years old and 
the youngest being 15. Age, gender and education were not significantly skewed as their values 
were close to zero. Marital status, race, disability and disability grants however appeared to be 
significantly skewed to the right meaning that half of the variables in the dataset were normally 
distributed while the other half were not. The distribution of age, gender and education followed a 
leptokurtic distribution because their kurtosis values were close to 2 or slightly above 2. Overall, 
there was evidence suggesting that the data set was not relatively symmetrical as one may have 
expected because of the heavy tailed distributions of race, marital status, disability and disability 
grants. This is because in the case of race the black population was more dominant than any other 
race, unmarried individuals were more dominant than married individuals, the non-disabled 
population was more dominant than PWDs and in the case of disability grants, non-grant recipients 
were more dominant than grant-recipients. 
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Table 1: Summary of regression variables 
  Age  Gender Race Education 
Marital 
Status Disability 
Disability 
Grants 
Mean 33.70 - - - - - - 
Median 31 - - - - - - 
Maximum 65 - - - - - - 
Minimum 15 - - - - - - 
Std. Dev. 14.15 0.45 0.64 0.96 0.24 0.24 0.20 
Skewness 0.51 -0.26 2.92 0.88 3.57 3.60 4.70 
Kurtosis 2.08 1.07 11.70 3.49 13.78 13.98 23.06 
N 31226 31221 31225 31177 31226 31148 31193 
Source: Author’s own calculation from Stata 
 
4.1.2 Disability and age, gender, race, education, depression, marital status 
6% of the population reported some form of disability while disability prevalence was higher in 
women than it was in men as demonstrated in figure 1 below. 60% of the disabled population were 
female while 40% were male. In terms of race, disability prevalence was highest in the black 
population than in any other race as 83% of the disabled population was African while only 1% 
was Asian/Indian. The high prevalence amongst the black population could however be because 
majority of the population was Black and therefore expected to contribute to a greater share of the 
disabled population. This therefore required further investigation into within race disability which 
shows a different picture. The White population had a higher within race disability prevalence of 
8% compared to the Black population with 6%. 
 
Figure 1: Disability Prevalence across gender
 
60%
40%
Female Male
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Source: Author’s own calculation from Stata 
 
Figure 2: Disability prevalence across race 
Source: Author’s own calculation from Stata 
 
In relation to disability and age, PWDs were more likely to be between the age of 46-55 as 24% 
of them reported disability in this age group compared to 18% between the age of 15-25 as seen 
on figure 3 below. These finding were expected and agree with Gerschick (2000) and Loprest & 
Maag (2003) who found that disability increased with age. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of age for PWDs and persons without disability 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from Stata 
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In terms of education, PWDs had low levels of education as most of them had no education or had 
achieved primary school education as shown on figure 3 below. 49% of the disabled population 
had either no education or had only attained primary school education, while only 1% of the 
disabled population had a degree. In comparison to persons without disability, 27% of them had 
either no education or had attained primary school education while 2% of them had a degree. These 
findings show that PWDs had attained lower levels of education compared to their non-disabled 
counterparts, which corresponds to the findings of previous research where PWDs were found to 
have lower levels of education and negative labour market outcomes (Hum & Simpson, 1996; 
Elwan, 1999).  
 
Figure 4: Level of education attained for PWDs and persons without disability 
 
Source: Authors own compilation from stata 
 
In relation to marital status, persons with disabilities were less likely to be married as indicated 
by figure 5 where 19% were married compared to 21% for persons without disabilities. These 
findings were expected and are similar to those of Hahn (1981) who found that individuals with 
visible physical disabilities found it harder to find marital partners because of the stigma attached 
to disability, and Meyer & Mok (2014) who found that PWDs were less likely to marry than 
people without disabilities. 
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Figure 5: Marital status for PWDs and persons without disability 
 
Source: Authors own compilation from stata 
 
4.1.3 Disability and occupation/sector 
Results indicated that PWDs were mostly working in elementary occupations as indicated on table 
2 below. 43% of the disabled population worked in elementary occupations while only 3% 
occupied managerial positions. For persons without disabilities, managerial positions were 
occupied by 4% of the non-disabled population while 34% worked in elementary occupations. 
This shows that minimal progress has been made towards employment equity as PWDs remain 
under-represented in high-level jobs. These findings were however expected as studies have 
previously found that PWDs were under-represented in highly skilled jobs (Maja et al., 2011) 
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Table 2: Level of occupation for PWD’s and non-disabled 
Occupation PWD (%) 
Non-disabled 
(%) 
Managers 3.18% 4.18% 
Professionals 11.74% 11.98% 
Technicians and associate profession 3.73% 4.50% 
Clerical support workers 4.01% 5.89% 
Service and sales workers 16.30% 17.26% 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and farming 0.55% 0.77% 
Craft and related trades workers 8.98% 10.94% 
Plant and machine operators 8.01% 10.14% 
Elementary occupations 43.37% 34.04% 
Total  100% 100% 
Source: Author’s own calculation from stata 
 
In relation to the sectors/industries where PWD’s worked, majority of them worked in the 
community/social and personal services sector while the electricity, gas and water supply sectors 
were the least represented. The mining and quarrying sector; construction sector and the transport, 
storage and communication sectors were also underrepresented. The underrepresentation of PWDs 
in the mining, quarrying and construction sectors can be explained by the labour intensive nature 
of jobs in these industries while underrepresentation in the transport, storage and communication 
sectors can be explained by the inability to communicate for those with seeing hearing and speech 
disabilities, or locomotive shortcomings for those with physical disabilities. This is especially true 
for PWDs with physical disabilities and those with seeing/ hearing/ speech disabilities which form 
majority of the population under study.  
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Table 3: Sectors occupied by PWD’s and non-disabled 
Sector PWDs (%) 
Non-
Disabled (%) 
Private households 16.2 9.6 
Agriculture/hunting/forestry/farming 12.9 12.4 
Mining and Quarrying 2.1 3.8 
Manufacturing 9.2 10.6 
Electricity/gas/water supply 1.1 1.1 
Construction 4.7 5.6 
Wholesale/retail trade 14.4 17.1 
Transport/storage/communication 4.3 4.2 
Financial intermediation/insurance 5.6 7.8 
Community/social/personal service 29.5 27.8 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Authors own compilation from stata 
 
4.2 Results  
4.2.1 Specification test results 
Specification tests were run to determine the most appropriate model in explaining the effects of 
disability on labour market outcomes using NIDS data. Results from the Breusch-Pagan test which 
determined the most appropriate model between the pooled OLS and the random effects model 
found p-values of less than 0.05 as shown on appendix 1. This led to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis which meant that there were variances across entities and that the random effects model 
was better than the pooled OLS model at explaining the effects of disability on labour market 
outcomes. Results from the Hausman test used to determine the most appropriate model between 
the random effects and the fixed effects model also found p-values of less than 0.05 as shown on 
appendix 2, which led to the rejection of the null hypothesis. This meant that the difference in 
coefficients was systematic and that the fixed effects model was the most appropriate model in 
explaining the effects of disability on labour market outcomes.  
 
It is however important to note that the Hausman test is not an absolute test because it is made 
under the assumption that significant p-values indicate correlation between explanatory variables 
and unit effects, when in most applications the true correlation between the covariates and unit 
effects is not exactly zero (Clark & Linzer, 2014). This means that the test could have insufficient 
statistical power to reliably distinguish a small correlation from a zero correlation. 
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4.2.2 Fixed effects 
In this model the gender and race variables were omitted because they are time invariant and 
therefore not expected to change over time as shown on table 4 below. The coefficients for 
disability, disability type and disability grants were also significantly lower than the coefficients 
from the pooled OLS and random effects regression models. This was expected because fixed 
effects models analyse variation within units and control for any unobserved heterogeneity across 
units. The effects of disability on labour force participation and employment was not statistically 
significant but the effect on wages was statistically significant at the 10% level. There was also no 
effect of disability type on participation, employment and wages for all types of disability except 
those with sight, hearing and speech disabilities which had a significant effect on wages. Wages 
were likely to decrease by 9% after an individual became disabled and also likely to decrease by 
14% after an individual had sight, hearing and speech impairments. The effect of disability grants 
on labour force participation and employment was however statistically significant as grant 
recipients were 12% less likely to participate and 8% less likely to be employed than individuals 
who did not receive a disability grant.  
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Table 4: Fixed effects model regression results  
  Disability Disability type 
VARIABLES LFP EMP WAGE LFP EMP WAGE 
age 0.0784*** 0.0717*** 0.128*** 0.0776*** 0.0722*** 0.128*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00795) (0.0263) (0.00843) (0.00796) (0.0263) 
age2 
-
0.00111*** 
-
0.000821*** 
-
0.000991*** 
-
0.00110*** 
-
0.000819*** 
-
0.000998*** 
 (4.81e-05) (4.49e-05) (0.000186) (4.79e-05) (4.48e-05) (0.000185) 
non-grade7 -0.0330** -0.0632*** 0.0737 -0.0335** -0.0614*** 0.0713 
 (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0773) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0768) 
grade8-11 0.114*** -0.0592*** 0.172* 0.114*** -0.0572*** 0.170* 
 (0.0223) (0.0195) (0.102) (0.0222) (0.0194) (0.101) 
grade12 0.175*** 0.00303 0.189* 0.174*** 0.00460 0.187* 
 (0.0254) (0.0239) (0.106) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.104) 
degree 0.275*** 0.0756 0.214 0.273*** 0.0850* 0.218* 
 (0.0441) (0.0464) (0.133) (0.0437) (0.0460) (0.131) 
female - - - - - - 
married -0.0205* -0.0144 -0.00623 -0.0186* -0.0128 -0.00496 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0286) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0285) 
coloured - - - - - - 
asian/indian - - - - - - 
white - - - - - - 
disabled 0.00319 0.00454 -0.0887*    
 (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0489)    
grant-recipient -0.122*** -0.0795*** -0.0174    
 (0.0195) (0.0165) (0.0658)    
physc. handicapped     -0.0464 -0.0418 -0.00393 
     (0.0382) (0.0317) (0.0979) 
sight/hear/speech     0.0129 0.0195 -0.142** 
     (0.0264) (0.0244) (0.0717) 
psych. disorders     -0.0542 -0.0316 -0.0111 
     (0.0415) (0.0336) (0.117) 
other disability     - - - 
_Iyear_2010 -0.154*** -0.0935*** -0.305*** -0.153*** -0.0895*** -0.308*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0344) (0.107) (0.0361) (0.0344) (0.107) 
_Iyear_2011 -0.0994*** -0.0676** -0.330*** -0.0991*** -0.0630** -0.327*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0317) (0.0927) (0.0333) (0.0317) (0.0926) 
_Iyear_2012 -0.0511** -0.0434** -0.196*** -0.0502** -0.0407** -0.198*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0628) (0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0626) 
_Iyear_2014 0.0112 0.0244** -0.0421 0.0123 0.0264*** -0.0430 
 (0.00973) (0.00967) (0.0287) (0.00972) (0.00966) (0.0287) 
o._Iyear_2015 - - - - - - 
pweight 
-7.33e-
06*** 
-6.08e-
06*** -8.05e-07 
-6.93e-
06*** -5.90e-06** -7.67e-07 
 (2.38e-06) (2.34e-06) (6.14e-06) (2.37e-06) (2.34e-06) (6.13e-06) 
Constant -0.565** -0.845*** 4.823*** -0.553* -0.871*** 4.845*** 
 (0.287) (0.272) (0.920) (0.287) (0.272) (0.917) 
Observations 40,392 40,392 10,779 40,532 40,532 10,819 
R-squared 0.081 0.061 0.223 0.079 0.060 0.224 
Number of pid 18,083 18,083 6,617 18,100 18,100 6,629 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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4.4 Discussion of results 
Although the effects of other labour market determinants such as age, gender, race, education and 
marital status were included in the regression equations, this discussion will focus on the effects 
of disability, disability type and disability grants on labour market outcomes as these were the 
main objectives of this study. A general observation from the pooled OLS model as shown on 
appendix 1, was that the coefficients for disability, disability type and disability grants were higher 
than those of the random effects and fixed effects models. This was because the pooled OLS model 
did not account for heterogeneity and therefore had the potential of overestimating the effects on 
labour market outcomes. Coefficients from the random effects model as shown on appendix 2 were 
also greater than the fixed effects model which has the tendency to underestimate the coefficients 
of variables as seen on table 4. In as much as specification tests identified the fixed effects model 
to be the most appropriate model for explaining this dataset, this study was interested in accounting 
for between group comparisons which pooled OLS and random effects model explain. A brief 
explanation on the results from the pooled OLS and random effects model will therefore be 
discussed. 
 
Results from the pooled and random effects model where PWDs were less likely to participate in 
the labour market or be employed by 4% and earn 14%-16% less than persons without disabilities 
were expected. This is because the penalties of having a disability are quite significant in the South 
African labour market after studies found a 1% representation of PWDs in most of South Africa’s 
top 100 organizations while low rates of labour market participation were reported amongst PWDs 
(Gida & Ortlepp, 2007; Commission for Employment Equity, 2017). These results also correspond 
to those of Kidd et al., (2000), Brown & Emery (2008) and Hum & Simpson (1996) who found 
that PWDs were 30% less likely to participate in the labour market and likely to earn 37% less 
than persons without disability. The coefficients in this study were however lower in comparison 
to previous research which can be attributed to the use of different econometric models applied in 
the analysis of data. Kidd et. al, (2000) used a probit model while Brown & Emery (2008) used a 
probit model, an OLS regression model and a Heckman two-stage estimation model. 
 
In the fixed effects model, disability did not have a significant effect on labour force participation 
and employment but had a significant effect on wages as wages were likely to decrease by 8%. 
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This could mean that the onset of disability did not cause any job loss but significant reduction in 
the number of hours worked for disabled individuals, leading to a reduction in wages. The 
reduction in wages was consistent with the results from the pooled OLS and random effects model 
and is especially true for individuals who become permanently ill which has a negative effect on 
wages. Pelkowski & Berger (2004) found that permanent health conditions had a negative effect 
on wages and hours worked for both men and women when analyzing the impact of health on 
employment, wages and hours worked over an individual’s life cycle. The fact that disability did 
not have a significant effect on labour force participation and employment under the fixed effects 
model could also mean that the onset of disability did not affect the decision of individuals to 
participate in the labour market and that the decision to participate was motivated by factors other 
than disability. 
 
The negative effects of disability grants on labour force participation and employment were 
consistent in all three models as participation was likely to decrease by 12% to 38% while the 
likelihood of employment was likely to decrease by 8% to 32%. These findings correspond to 
previous literature on the disincentive effects of disability grants on labour supply which have been 
found to serve as an alternative source of income to disability grant holders (Johannsmeier, 2007). 
This is also true in the case of South Africa where Mutasa (2012) found that the receipt of a 
disability grant reduced the likelihood of labour force participation by 22.3%. 
 
In relation to the types of disability, the pooled OLS and random effects model found significant 
effects of disability type on labour force participation and employment but not on wages. 
Individuals who were physically handicapped, those with sight, hearing and speech disabilities; 
and those with psychological or psychiatric disorders were less likely to participate in the labour 
market or be employed than those who did not have these disabilities. These results were expected 
as Kidd et. al (2000) found that the type of disability did not influence wages but only participation 
and employment. The effect of sight, hearing and speech disabilities on wages was however 
statistically significant at the 10% level and can be explained as an outlier as these results were not 
expected. 
 
50 
 
Persons who were physically handicapped were 30% to 35% less likely to participate in the labour 
market and 25% to 32% less likely to be employed than persons who were not physically 
handicapped. These findings were similar to the findings of Park, Yoon & Henderson (2007) who 
found that people with mobility disabilities had employment rates that were 34% lower than the 
general population. The results also confirm the findings of Maja et al. (2011) who reported the 
lack of disability friendly workspaces as one of the greatest deterrents to the employment of PWDs 
in South Africa. It could also be that the perception of employers towards people with physical 
disabilities has not changed as previous studies indicated that this group of individuals faced higher 
levels of discrimination because their disability is visible (Shier, Graham & Jones, 2009).  
 
Individuals with sight, hearing and speech disabilities were 8% to 9% less likely to participate in 
the labour market and 5% to 8% less likely to be employed than people without sight, hearing and 
speech disabilities. In comparison to people with physical disabilities, the penalties of sight, 
hearing and speech disabilities were lower and can be explained by the active presence of braille 
literacy training institutions that cater to the blind as well as the presence of special education 
schools that cater to the needs of individuals with hearing and speech disabilities (Mutanga, 2017). 
These individuals are therefore better prepared for the labour market and can choose career paths 
that better align them for the job market.  
 
Individuals with psychological and psychiatric disorders were 19% to 22% less likely to participate 
in the labour market and 16% to 19% less likely to be employed than individuals without 
psychological and psychiatric disorders. In comparison to people with physical disabilities, these 
results were not expected as previous studies indicated that persons with psychological disorders 
had the least likelihood of employment (Boman et al., 2015). Their better labour market outcomes 
can be attributed to the growth of mental health awareness programmes which seek to improve the 
treatment of mental health in South Africa (Lund et al., 2012). Such programmes encourage people 
with psychological and psychiatric disorders to deal with their mental problems while at the same 
time reduce the negative perception of employers towards mental disabilities. The overall effect 
would therefore translate to better labour market outcomes for this group of individuals. 
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Under the fixed effects model, the type of disability had no effect on labour force participation, 
employment or wages except for individuals with sight, hearing and speech disabilities which was 
likely to cause a decrease in wages by 14%. These results were not expected as previous research 
indicated that the type of disability did not influence wages but influenced participation and 
employment (Kidd et. al, 2000). This difference in outcomes can be attributed to the application 
of different statistical methods and sample sizes which influence the significance of results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes and concludes the findings of this study, provides suggestions for future 
research and gives recommendations to inform policy.  
 
5.1 Summary 
The objectives of this study were to measure the effects of disability, disability type and disability 
grants on labour market outcomes in South Africa using the NIDS dataset. Data was analysed as a 
panel for successful interviews from Wave 1 to Wave 4. A pooled OLS regression model, a random 
effects model and a fixed effects model were applied to the data and specification tests were 
performed to determine which of the three models was the most appropriate. The Breusch-Pagan 
test revealed that there were variances across entities and that the random effects model was better 
than the pooled OLS model in explaining the dataset, while the Hausman test revealed that the 
fixed effects model was better than the random effects model at explaining the dataset.  
 
Given that the fixed effects model accounted for heterogeneity across units, this study found that 
disability did not influence labour force participation and employment but influenced wages as 
wages were likely to decrease by 9% after the occurrence of a disability. Disability type had no 
effect on labour force participation, employment and wages for all types of disability except for 
sight, hearing and speech disabilities where wages were likely to decrease by 14% after an 
individual developed these disabilities. Disability grants had a negative effect on labour force 
participation and employment as they were likely to decrease participation by 12% and 
employment by 8% showing the disincentive effects of disability grants on labour supply. The 
insignificant effects of disability and disability type on labour force participation and employment 
could be explained by the fact that the decision to participate in the labour market or that of being 
employed is motivated by unobserved differences across individuals which requires further 
investigation into the perceptions and attitudes of PWDs.  
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While taking these results into consideration, it is however important to note that fixed effects 
models control for heterogeneity across individuals and therefore allow for within group 
comparisons, but do not account for between group comparisons which this study was also 
interested in. Fixed effects models also limit results to the sample population which does not allow 
for the generalization of results beyond the sample and therefore proves difficult when informing 
policy. The pooled OLS and random effects model on the other hand allow for between group 
comparisons across the disabled and non-disabled population, but certain assumptions must hold 
for the results to be effective. The assumption of no correlation between unobserved differences 
and the independent variables must hold under the random effects model which this study was not 
able to prove and therefore requires further application of correlated random effects models to 
simulate unobserved differences into the model. The pooled OLS and the random effects model 
both showed that disability, disability type and disability grants had negative effects on labour 
force participation, employment and wages, and because the regression equations used the inverse 
mills ratio to control for bias, these coefficients were not likely to be biased. Although random 
effects models have been faulted for bias, they may be preferred if they provide sufficient variance 
reduction over fixed effects which cannot be estimated by the Hausman test (Clark & Linzer, 
2014). 
 
Furthermore, because the random effects model allows for the generalization of inferences beyond 
the sample and therefore better at informing policy, the less likelihood of PWDs participating in 
the labour market or being employed by 4%, and their likelihood of earning 14% less than persons 
without disabilities may be of interest to policy makers. Similarly, the penalties of having a 
physical disability on labour market outcomes which were greater than all other types of disability 
may provide insight to policy makers on the priority areas of intervention for the different types 
of disability when formulating policies.  This was after results indicated that individuals with 
physical disabilities were 30% less likely to participate in the labour market and 25% less likely 
to be employed compared to 8% and 5% for individuals with sight, hearing and speech disabilities. 
 
5.2 Conclusion  
The findings of this study provide evidence of the existence of inequalities in labour market 
outcomes in relation to disability. Although there were no significant effects of disability and 
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disability type on labour force participation and employment, PWDs remain economically 
disadvantaged as the onset of disability shows a reduction in wages by 9%. This could mean that 
the decision to participate in the labour market and that of being employed is likely to be motivated 
by unobserved factors, especially because significant effects of disability and disability type were 
found on participation and employment under the pooled OLS and random effect models. It could 
also mean that disability onset did not cause the loss of employment but a reduction in the number 
of hours worked and consequently a reduction in wages. This draws attention to the significance 
of rehabilitation centres which allow for the transition of PWDs back into the labour market after 
undergoing permanent illness to allow for the absorption of shocks caused by health on wages. 
Disability grants were also found to have disincentive effects on labour force supply as they were 
likely to reduce participation and employment by 12% and 8% respectively. This can be explained 
by the fact that disability grant recipients have an alternative source of income showing the 
disincentive effects of disability grants on labour supply. 
 
These findings however only apply to the sample population as fixed effects models limit the 
generalization of results beyond the population under study. To allow for the generalization of 
results across the South African population as well as to inform policy, the random effects model 
provides more appropriate estimates. When compared to persons without disabilities, PWDs 
experience negative labour market outcomes which can be seen in their lower participation, 
employment and wage rates. Evidence suggests that they are less likely to participate in the labour 
market or be employed by 4% and likely to earn 14% less than persons without disabilities. This 
shows that the enactment of employment equity laws in the Republic of South Africa has not 
yielded much results and therefore requires the rethinking of policies especially those related to 
disability. However, because random effects models do not test for the lack of correlation between 
unobserved characteristics and the independent variables, it could also mean that the perception 
and attitudes of PWDs may have an influence on their lack of participation and employment thus 
overestimating the effects. This therefore requires the application of different econometric models 
such as correlated random effects models to account for unobserved differences. 
 
In relation to the types of disability, people with physical disabilities experienced the highest 
penalties on labour market outcomes as they were less likely to participate or be employed by 30% 
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and 25% respectively compared to persons without physical disabilities. This shows that 
environmental barriers and the lack of disability friendly workspaces remain one of the greatest 
deterrents to the employment of PWDs in South Africa and should be considered as a priority area 
for policy makers. This may require strict implementation of disability friendly workspaces at the 
company level to improve labour market outcomes for persons with physical disabilities. Also, 
because physical disabilities are visible, it could be that the attitude and perception towards 
individuals with physical disabilities is negative and therefore leads to their discrimination in the 
labour market. This however needs further investigation into the perception and attitudes of 
employers towards people with physical disabilities.  
 
5.3 Recommendations for future research 
Future research may apply mixed models in the analysis of data to overcome the underestimation 
effects of fixed effects models or the overestimation of results from pooled and random effects 
models. Qualitative research may also be undertaken to understand the perception of PWD’s 
towards labour force participation and employment, as well as the attitudes of employers towards 
PWDs so as to understand whether there is a correlation between these unobserved characteristics 
and labour market outcomes. A different dataset may also be used for comparison reasons and 
cross-sectional data may also be applied to compare results of disability, disability type and 
disability grants on labour market outcomes.  This study may also be replicated in other emerging 
economies to understand how South Africa’s disability policies compare to other emerging 
economies and the severity of disability should also be analysed to understand its role in 
influencing labour market outcomes. 
 
The policy implications from this study indicate the need for the enforcement of employment 
equity laws for PWDs in South Africa because of the negative labour market outcomes they face. 
Despite the enactment of international laws such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disability (CRPD) and the Code of Good Practice on the Employment of People with Disabilities 
in South Africa, the implementation of these laws has been rather slow (United Nations, 2006; 
Republic of South Africa, 2002). According to the CRPD, the lack of an enabling environment far 
outweighs the incapacity of individuals with disabilities in determining their labour market 
outcomes because PWDs are defined as people with long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
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sensory impairments who are hindered by equal participation in society because of the various 
barriers they face.  The vulnerabilities faced by PWDs because of social exclusion from education 
systems, and negative perceptions from the stigma of society requires urgent attention in the form 
of creating awareness, and the implementation of policies that are already in place.  
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Appendix 1: Pooled OLS regression results 
  Disability Disability type 
VARIABLES LFP EMP WAGE LFP EMP WAGE 
age 0.0920*** 0.0730*** 0.0404*** 0.0900*** 0.0713*** 0.0387*** 
 (0.000943) (0.000992) (0.00581) (0.000961) (0.000999) (0.00583) 
age2 -0.00114*** -0.000865*** -0.000244*** -0.00112*** -0.000848*** -0.000228*** 
 (1.29e-05) (1.35e-05) (7.59e-05) (1.32e-05) (1.37e-05) (7.63e-05) 
non-grade7 0.0595*** 0.0459*** 0.515*** 0.0701*** 0.0548*** 0.519*** 
 (0.00672) (0.00695) (0.0267) (0.00692) (0.00708) (0.0268) 
grade8-11 0.168*** 0.129*** 1.006*** 0.184*** 0.143*** 1.012*** 
 (0.00879) (0.00918) (0.0327) (0.00892) (0.00925) (0.0328) 
grade12 0.238*** 0.260*** 1.583*** 0.260*** 0.278*** 1.591*** 
 (0.00933) (0.0108) (0.0341) (0.00943) (0.0109) (0.0341) 
degree 0.289*** 0.369*** 2.257*** 0.313*** 0.390*** 2.263*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0468) (0.0139) (0.0161) (0.0470) 
female -0.129*** -0.154*** -0.475*** -0.130*** -0.155*** -0.482*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00504) (0.0193) (0.00487) (0.00513) (0.0193) 
married -0.0362*** -0.000741 0.140*** -0.0281*** 0.00643 0.145*** 
 (0.00850) (0.00895) (0.0284) (0.00863) (0.00905) (0.0285) 
colored 0.104*** 0.130*** 0.135*** 0.102*** 0.128*** 0.138*** 
 (0.00697) (0.00750) (0.0235) (0.00724) (0.00769) (0.0236) 
asian/indian -0.0261 0.0143 0.473*** -0.0370 0.00495 0.479*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0940) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0940) 
white 0.0243 0.0941*** 0.601*** 0.0243 0.0942*** 0.604*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0486) (0.0157) (0.0165) (0.0483) 
disabled -0.0423*** -0.0476*** -0.164***    
 (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0408)    
grant-recipient -0.382*** -0.323*** -0.617***    
 (0.0137) (0.0118) (0.0956)    
_Iyear_2010 -0.102*** -0.112*** -0.0792** -0.0558*** -0.0473*** -0.0849** 
 (0.00781) (0.00793) (0.0395) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0395) 
_Iyear_2011 -0.0493*** -0.0676***      
 (0.0121) (0.0121)      
_Iyear_2012 -0.0442*** -0.0757*** 0.0483 0.00180 -0.0119 0.0403 
 (0.00714) (0.00727) (0.0362) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0362) 
_Iyear_2014 - -      
_Iyear_2015 -0.0346*** -0.0450*** 0.150*** 0.00859 0.0161 0.137*** 
 (0.00741) (0.00774) (0.0379) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0378) 
pweight 5.63e-06*** 5.53e-06*** 2.39e-05*** 5.88e-06*** 5.72e-06*** 2.41e-05*** 
 (9.67e-07) (1.08e-06) (3.25e-06) (9.94e-07) (1.10e-06) (3.26e-06) 
o._Iyear_2011   - - - - 
_Iyear_2014   0.195*** 0.0470*** 0.0649*** 0.182*** 
   (0.0419) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0420) 
physc. handicapped     -0.353*** -0.316*** -0.187 
     (0.0307) (0.0254) (0.209) 
sight/hear/speech     -0.0900*** -0.0761*** -0.159 
     (0.0250) (0.0244) (0.107) 
psych. disorders     -0.220*** -0.193*** 0.0159 
     (0.0381) (0.0331) (0.157) 
other disability     - - - 
Constant -1.006*** -0.856*** 6.204*** -1.031*** -0.902*** 6.237*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.114) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.114) 
Observations 40,392 40,392 10,779 40,532 40,532 10,819 
R-squared 0.298 0.264 0.460 0.282 0.252 0.457 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2: Random effects model results 
  Disability Disability type 
VARIABLES LFP EMP WAGE LFP EMP WAGE 
age 0.0921*** 0.0728*** 0.0550*** 0.0902*** 0.0713*** 0.0543*** 
 (0.000923) (0.000953) (0.00549) (0.000935) (0.000955) (0.00549) 
age2 
-
0.00114*** 
-
0.000864*** 
-
0.000447*** 
-
0.00112*** 
-
0.000849*** 
-
0.000440*** 
 (1.26e-05) (1.30e-05) (7.16e-05) (1.28e-05) (1.31e-05) (7.18e-05) 
non-grade7 0.0564*** 0.0441*** 0.520*** 0.0656*** 0.0517*** 0.523*** 
 (0.00650) (0.00651) (0.0260) (0.00665) (0.00659) (0.0261) 
grade8-11 0.170*** 0.125*** 1.021*** 0.185*** 0.137*** 1.026*** 
 (0.00867) (0.00879) (0.0313) (0.00877) (0.00882) (0.0314) 
grade12 0.238*** 0.249*** 1.452*** 0.258*** 0.264*** 1.455*** 
 (0.00919) (0.0105) (0.0339) (0.00926) (0.0105) (0.0340) 
degree 0.290*** 0.361*** 2.133*** 0.312*** 0.380*** 2.133*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0457) (0.0137) (0.0160) (0.0457) 
female -0.128*** -0.151*** -0.481*** -0.129*** -0.152*** -0.486*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00494) (0.0186) (0.00482) (0.00501) (0.0187) 
married -0.0301*** 0.000904 0.0490** -0.0228*** 0.00607 0.0495** 
 (0.00822) (0.00839) (0.0237) (0.00829) (0.00844) (0.0237) 
coloured 0.104*** 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.149*** 
 (0.00692) (0.00735) (0.0226) (0.00716) (0.00752) (0.0227) 
asian/indian -0.0231 0.0210 0.543*** -0.0325 0.0135 0.549*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0900) (0.0234) (0.0238) (0.0900) 
white 0.0275* 0.103*** 0.711*** 0.0277* 0.104*** 0.719*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0494) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0494) 
disabled -0.0405*** -0.0412*** -0.138***    
 (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0346)    
grant-recipient -0.349*** -0.275*** -0.378***    
 (0.0134) (0.0114) (0.0748)    
physc. 
handicapped     -0.301*** -0.248*** -0.130 
     (0.0294) (0.0239) (0.133) 
sight/hear/speech     -0.0754*** -0.0543** -0.135* 
     (0.0235) (0.0222) (0.0795) 
psych. disorders     -0.194*** -0.158*** -0.0220 
     (0.0357) (0.0296) (0.0993) 
other disability     - - - 
_Iyear_2010 -0.0705*** -0.0687*** -0.313*** -0.0679*** -0.0661*** -0.311*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00580) (0.0193) (0.00595) (0.00580) (0.0194) 
_Iyear_2011 -0.0175 -0.0276*** -0.272*** -0.0131 -0.0230** -0.261*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0289) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0288) 
_Iyear_2012 -0.0106* -0.0321*** -0.195*** -0.00831 -0.0302*** -0.194*** 
 (0.00542) (0.00529) (0.0145) (0.00543) (0.00530) (0.0145) 
_Iyear_2014 0.0301*** 0.0382*** -0.00291 0.0327*** 0.0408*** -0.00513 
 (0.00725) (0.00743) (0.0218) (0.00728) (0.00745) (0.0218) 
o._Iyear_2015 - - - - - - 
pweight 
5.24e-
06*** 4.95e-06*** 2.16e-05*** 
5.40e-
06*** 5.07e-06*** 2.16e-05*** 
 (9.49e-07) (1.04e-06) (3.00e-06) (9.70e-07) (1.05e-06) (3.02e-06) 
Constant -1.041*** -0.893*** 6.166*** -1.024*** -0.879*** 6.174*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.103) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.104) 
Observations 40,392 40,392 10,779 40,532 40,532 10,819 
Number of pid 18,083 18,083 6,617 18,100 18,100 6,629 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix 3: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects on disability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1274.62
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0230242       .1517372
                       e     .1435942       .3789382
                     lfp     .2490129       .4990119
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lfp[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  2790.67
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0360198       .1897888
                       e     .1275144       .3570916
                  employ     .2358074          .4856
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        employ[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1703.55
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .3968949       .6299959
                       e     .2289803       .4785189
                lincome2     1.164191       1.078977
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lincome2[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
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Appendix 4: Hausman test for fixed vs random effects model on disability 
a) Hausman Test lfp 
 
b) Hausman test emp 
 
 
 
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      436.16
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -7.33e-06     5.24e-06       -.0000126        2.32e-06
 _Iyear_2014      .0111622     .0301409       -.0189788        .0063571
 _Iyear_2012     -.0510932    -.0106087       -.0404846        .0210281
 _Iyear_2011        -.0994    -.0175353       -.0818647        .0319973
 _Iyear_2010     -.1535129    -.0704563       -.0830566        .0358167
_Igrantrec~1     -.1218632    -.3487375        .2268743         .013256
_Idisabled_1       .003193    -.0405035        .0436965        .0088985
 _Imarried_1     -.0204879    -.0301189         .009631        .0068259
_Ieducatio~5      .2751331     .2895946       -.0144615        .0481072
_Ieducatio~4      .1748701     .2383688       -.0634987        .0252483
_Ieducatio~3      .1136287     .1701851       -.0565564        .0220994
_Ieducatio~2     -.0329941     .0564082       -.0894023        .0167989
        age2     -.0011058    -.0011395        .0000338         .000046
         age      .0783973     .0920607       -.0136634        .0083772
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      443.30
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -6.08e-06     4.95e-06        -.000011        2.16e-06
 _Iyear_2014       .024447     .0381631       -.0137161        .0057192
 _Iyear_2012     -.0434001    -.0321191        -.011281        .0197938
 _Iyear_2011     -.0675881    -.0276304       -.0399577        .0300535
 _Iyear_2010      -.093513    -.0687376       -.0247755        .0337313
_Igrantrec~1     -.0794934    -.2750215        .1955281        .0119233
_Idisabled_1       .004536    -.0412499        .0457859        .0079461
 _Imarried_1     -.0143655      .000904       -.0152694        .0061533
_Ieducatio~5      .0755761     .3609989       -.2854228        .0448507
_Ieducatio~4      .0030265     .2489045       -.2458779        .0235164
_Ieducatio~3     -.0591855     .1246935        -.183879         .020597
_Ieducatio~2      -.063178     .0441094       -.1072874        .0156499
        age2     -.0008214    -.0008636        .0000423        .0000431
         age      .0716965     .0727618       -.0010653        .0078851
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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c) Hausman test wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      468.69
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -8.05e-07     .0000216       -.0000224        5.31e-06
 _Iyear_2014     -.0420618    -.0029095       -.0391523        .0173358
 _Iyear_2012     -.1960799    -.1945389        -.001541        .0616371
 _Iyear_2011     -.3303212    -.2717057       -.0586155         .090401
 _Iyear_2010     -.3053219     -.313411        .0080891         .103774
_Igrantrec~1     -.0174173    -.3776076        .3601903        .0751686
_Idisabled_1     -.0886611    -.1382044        .0495433        .0264175
 _Imarried_1     -.0062314     .0490117       -.0552432        .0155939
_Ieducatio~5      .2136676      2.13322       -1.919552        .1331422
_Ieducatio~4      .1889036     1.452356       -1.263452        .1040509
_Ieducatio~3      .1717381     1.021469       -.8497305        .1045049
_Ieducatio~2      .0737071     .5199288       -.4462217        .0852023
        age2     -.0009912    -.0004471       -.0005441        .0001652
         age      .1283335     .0549746         .073359        .0255852
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Appendix 5: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test for random effects on disability type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1557.98
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0271039       .1646326
                       e     .1438534       .3792801
                     lfp     .2490073       .4990063
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lfp[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  3092.25
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0388915       .1972092
                       e     .1277313       .3573952
                  employ     .2358525       .4856465
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        employ[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1727.82
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .4014518       .6336022
                       e     .2282912       .4777982
                lincome2     1.164341       1.079046
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lincome2[pid,t] = Xb + u[pid] + e[pid,t]
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Appendix 6: Hausman test for fixed vs random effects model on disability type 
a) Hausman test lfp disability type 
 
 
b) Hausman test emp disability type 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      259.17
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -6.93e-06     5.40e-06       -.0000123        2.31e-06
 _Iyear_2014      .0123454      .032726       -.0203806        .0062942
 _Iyear_2012     -.0502374     -.008307       -.0419305        .0209799
 _Iyear_2011     -.0991317    -.0130509       -.0860808        .0319091
 _Iyear_2010     -.1527518    -.0679132       -.0848386        .0357386
    distype3     -.0542051    -.1938255        .1396204         .027358
    distype2      .0129141     -.075409        .0883232        .0183267
    distype1      -.046358    -.3013398        .2549818        .0251653
 _Imarried_1     -.0185776     -.022794        .0042165        .0067554
_Ieducatio~5      .2725955     .3117121       -.0391166        .0476396
_Ieducatio~4      .1741954     .2578326       -.0836372        .0250903
_Ieducatio~3      .1143873     .1852156       -.0708284         .021976
_Ieducatio~2     -.0335263     .0655838       -.0991101        .0166893
        age2     -.0010984    -.0011206        .0000222        .0000459
         age      .0776013     .0901802       -.0125789         .008363
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      286.63
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -5.90e-06     5.07e-06        -.000011        2.14e-06
 _Iyear_2014      .0263942     .0408033       -.0144091        .0056793
 _Iyear_2012     -.0407053    -.0301956       -.0105097        .0197486
 _Iyear_2011     -.0630445    -.0230478       -.0399967        .0299766
 _Iyear_2010     -.0894543    -.0660816       -.0233727        .0336572
    distype3     -.0315545    -.1580125         .126458        .0245472
    distype2       .019498    -.0543444        .0738424        .0163891
    distype1     -.0418093    -.2483468        .2065375        .0226354
 _Imarried_1     -.0128391     .0060667       -.0189058        .0061071
_Ieducatio~5      .0850347     .3796889       -.2946542        .0444345
_Ieducatio~4       .004597     .2638372       -.2592402        .0233826
_Ieducatio~3     -.0572339     .1365432       -.1937771        .0204932
_Ieducatio~2      -.061367     .0517282       -.1130953         .015556
        age2     -.0008195    -.0008486        .0000292        .0000429
         age      .0721918     .0712535        .0009384        .0078718
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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c) Hausman test wages disability type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      462.16
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     pweight     -7.67e-07     .0000216       -.0000224        5.28e-06
 _Iyear_2014     -.0430297    -.0051339       -.0378958        .0172155
 _Iyear_2012      -.197945    -.1939057       -.0040393        .0614114
 _Iyear_2011     -.3270647    -.2613429       -.0657218        .0900936
 _Iyear_2010     -.3077449    -.3112495        .0035046        .1033763
    distype3      -.011134    -.0219502        .0108162        .0685793
    distype2     -.1422958    -.1348943       -.0074015        .0647201
    distype1     -.0039348    -.1296531        .1257183        .1314733
 _Imarried_1     -.0049581     .0494721       -.0544302         .015477
_Ieducatio~5      .2176884     2.132747       -1.915058        .1315395
_Ieducatio~4      .1873251       1.4548       -1.267475        .1031304
_Ieducatio~3       .170111     1.026413       -.8563022        .1036311
_Ieducatio~2      .0712893     .5230982       -.4518088        .0847445
        age2     -.0009984    -.0004405       -.0005579        .0001642
         age      .1280501     .0542567        .0737934        .0254904
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
